4-6322-17617-CV

STATE OF MINNESOTA

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

 

Eric V. Herendeen,

                                             Complainant,

 

vs.

 

Brett Corson,

 

Respondent.

 

 

FINDINGS OF FACT,

CONCLUSIONS, AND

ORDER

The above-entitled matter came on for an evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2007, before a panel of three Administrative Law Judges:  Bruce Johnson (Presiding Judge), Beverly Jones Heydinger, and Carol Eckersen.  The hearing record closed at the conclusion of the hearing that day.

Robert Sturtz, Attorney at Law, Goldman, Sturtz & Halvorsen, Chartered, 137 North Broadway, P.O. Box 1009, Albert Lea, MN  56007, represented the Complainant Eric Herendeen. 

Brett Corson (Respondent), Corson Law Offices, LLC, 117 St. Paul St. SW #2, P.O. Box 65, Preston, MN  55965, participated on his own behalf without counsel. 

NOTICE

          This is the final decision in this case, as provided in Minn. Stat. § 211B.36, subd. 5.  A party aggrieved by this decision may seek judicial review as provided in Minn. Stat. §§ 14.63 to 14.69.         

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

          Did Respondent violate Minn. Stat. § 211B.06 by intentionally participating in the preparation or dissemination of false campaign material that Respondent knew was false or communicated to others with reckless disregard as to whether it was false?

          The panel concludes that the Complainant has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Minn. Stat. § 211B.06, and therefore the Complaint is dismissed.

Based upon the entire record, the panel makes the following:

 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.     Eric Herendeen is currently the Chief Deputy County Attorney for Mower County.[1]    

2.     From 1997 until January 16, 2003, Mr. Herendeen served as an Assistant Fillmore County Attorney.  Mr. Herendeen’s primary duties were to prosecute traffic offenses, DWI offenses, juvenile delinquency and dependency matters, and certain gross misdemeanor violations.  It was not Mr. Herendeen’s responsibility to prosecute zoning violations or to advise department heads on zoning matters.  Instead, zoning matters were typically handled by then Fillmore County Attorney Matthew Opat or Assistant Fillmore County Attorney Tom Manion.  However, on one occasion in 1997, Mr. Herendeen handled a zoning matter when Mr. Opat had a conflict of interest.[2]

3.     In the 2002 general election, Mr. Herendeen and Brett Corson ran for the position of Fillmore County Attorney.  Herendeen was defeated by Corson by a vote of 4,796 (55%) to 3,907 (45%).

4.     In December of 2002, Mr. Herendeen resigned from the Fillmore County Attorney’s Office effective January 16, 2003.  On January 16, 2003, Mr. Herendeen began his position as Chief Deputy Mower County Attorney.[3]

5.     In late 2002 or early 2003, Fillmore County Zoning Administrator Norm Craig received complaints regarding the storage of semi-truck trailers on property owned by a Dan Moulton in Chatfield Township.  The property is zoned for agricultural use and abuts the City of Chatfield in Fillmore County.  Mr. Moulton, an attorney, has operated a business on this property since 1989 that involves renting and selling used semi-truck trailers.[4]  In 1989, Mr. Moulton had approximately four trailers stored on his property.[5]  By late 2002, Mr. Moulton had about 30 trailers stored on his property.[6]  Mr. Moulton did not have a permit to operate the trailer business on his property.[7]

6.     Upon receiving a zoning complaint, Mr. Craig’s typical procedure is to contact the offending party and attempt to get them to correct the problem.  Only if the offending party is resistant to correcting the problem, does Mr. Craig consult with the Fillmore County Attorney’s Office.[8]

7.     At no time while serving as Assistant Fillmore County Attorney was Mr. Herendeen aware that Mr. Moulton was improperly storing semi-truck trailers on his property.  Consequently, Mr. Herendeen did not take any action to remove the trailers or restrict the business.[9] 

8.     It was not until early 2004 that Mr. Craig wrote to Mr. Moulton and advised him that the storage of semi-truck trailers on his property violated Fillmore County zoning ordinances.[10]  It was also not until early 2004, that Mr. Craig brought the matter to the attention of the County Attorney’s Office.  The delay in notifying Mr. Moulton and the County Attorney’s Office was due in part to the fact that Fillmore County Attorney Brett Corson had been called to perform military duty in Afghanistan shortly after he took office in 2003.[11]    

9.     By letter dated December 3, 2004, Mr. Corson outlined the options available to Mr. Moulton to bring his semi-trailer storage operation into compliance with Fillmore County zoning ordinances.  Specifically, Mr. Corson advised Mr. Moulton to either seek a Rural Home Based Business permit or seek to have his property rezoned.  Mr. Corson informed Mr. Moulton that if he was unwilling to pursue either of these options, he must discontinue his storage operation.[12]

10.   In response to this notice, Mr. Moulton applied for a Rural Home Based Business permit.  Mr. Craig denied Mr. Moulton’s request for a permit, and Mr. Moulton appealed the denial to the Fillmore County Board of Adjustment.[13]  

11.  On April 21, 2005, the Fillmore County Board of Adjustment upheld Mr. Craig’s decision and denied Mr. Moulton’s appeal by a vote of 4-0.  Mr. Moulton then appealed the matter to District Court.[14] 

12.  On September 20, 2005, Mr. Moulton and Fillmore County entered into a settlement agreement wherein the County agreed to issue Mr. Moulton a Rural Home Based Business permit and to allow Mr. Moulton to park the semi-trailer trucks on his property subject to several conditions.  The agreement was drafted by Mr. Corson and signed by Mr. Moulton and Fillmore County Zoning Administrator Norm Craig.[15]   

13.   Following the settlement, some members of the Fillmore County Board of Adjustment complained to the Fillmore County Journal that they had not been consulted about the decision to negotiate a settlement with Mr. Moulton.  Likewise, the County Board chair, Duane Bakke, criticized Mr. Corson for not bringing the proposed settlement to the Fillmore County Board for approval.[16]

14.   In late 2005, Mr. Moulton had approximately 31 semi-truck trailers stored on his property.[17]

15.   Mr. Herendeen first became aware of the trailer truck storage issue shortly after the settlement between Mr. Moulton and the County was reached in late 2005.  During his tenure as an Assistant Fillmore County Attorney, Mr. Herendeen had no knowledge of any zoning problem concerning Mr. Moulton’s property.[18]     

16.   In 2006, Mr. Corson and Mr. Herendeen were again candidates for the position of Fillmore County Attorney.

17.   On October 11, 2006, Mr. Herendeen placed a campaign advertisement in the local Spring Valley Tribune newspaper.  The advertisement suggested that the settlement agreement with Mr. Moulton was the result of a “backroom deal” that Mr. Corson made without consulting the County Board, the Board of Adjustments, or the “people of Chatfield.”[19]

18.   Mr. Corson responded to Mr. Herendeen’s advertisement with his own campaign advertisement, which ran in several local newspapers during the week of October 16-20, 2006.  Under a heading in the advertisement that read: “The truth about the Chatfield trailers and Rural Home Based Business is … ,” Mr. Corson made the following statement:

My opponent failed to remove the trailers and restrict the business when he was Assistant Fillmore County Attorney.[20]

19.   The Complainant filed this Complaint with the Office of Administrative Hearings on November 1, 2006. 

20.   On November 7, 2006, Mr. Corson was re-elected as Fillmore County Attorney by a vote of 4,864 (55%) to 3,953 (45%).

21.   On November 8, 2006, Administrative Law Judge Bruce Johnson found that there was probable cause to believe that Mr. Corson violated Minnesota Statutes § 211B.06 as alleged in the Complaint.[21]

22.   This matter came on for hearing on January 5, 2007, at the Office of Administrative Hearings.  At the close of the Complainant’s case, the Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint.  The panel granted the motion and the complaint was dismissed.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the panel makes the following:

 

CONCLUSIONS

1.     Minn. Stat. § 211B.35 authorizes the panel of Administrative Law Judges to consider this matter.

2.     Campaign material is defined to mean “any literature, publication, or material that is disseminated for the purpose of influencing voting at a primary or other election, …”[22]  Respondent’s advertisement is campaign material within the meaning of that statute.

3.     Minn. Stat. § 211B.06, subd. 1, provides, in part:  “A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who intentionally participates in the preparation, dissemination … of … campaign material with respect to the personal or political character or acts of a candidate … that is designed or tends to elect, injure, promote, or defeat a candidate for nomination or election to a public office …, that is false, and that the person knows is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether it is false.”

4.           The burden of proving the allegations in the complaint is on the Complainant.  The standard of proof of a violation of Minn. Stat. § 211B.06, relating to false campaign material, is clear and convincing evidence.[23] 

5.           The Complainant has failed to demonstrate that the Respondent violated Minn. Stat. § 211B.06 because the evidence is insufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statement that Mr. Herendeen failed to remove the trailers and restrict Mr. Moulton’s business is false and that Respondent knew it was false or subjectively knew that it was probably false.[24] 

          Based upon the record herein, and for the reasons stated in the following Memorandum, the panel of Administrative Law Judges makes the following:


ORDER

          IT IS ORDERED:

1.     That the Complaint in this matter is DISMISSED.

2.     That the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

 

Dated:  January 10, 2007                                                                                                                                                             

/s Bruce H. Johnson

BRUCE H. JOHNSON

Presiding Administrative Law Judge

                                       

/s/ Beverly Jones Heydinger

BEVERLY JONES HEYDINGER

Administrative Law Judge

 

 

/s/ Carol A. Eckersen

CAROL A. ECKERSEN

Administrative Law Judge

 

 

 

MEMORANDUM

Minn. Stat. § 211B.06 prohibits the preparation and dissemination of false campaign material.  In order to be found to have violated this section, a person must intentionally participate in the preparation or dissemination of campaign material that the person knows is false or communicates with reckless disregard of whether it is false. 

The term “reckless disregard” was added to the statute in 1998 to expressly incorporate the “actual malice” standard from New York Times v. Sullivan.[25]  Based on this standard, the Complainant must show by clear and convincing evidence that the statement is false and that the Respondent either published the statement knowing it was false or published with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.  In Riley v. Jankowski,[26] the Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted the “reckless disregard” standard stated in Minn. Stat. § 211B.06, subd. 1, as requiring clear and convincing evidence that Respondent made the statement while subjectively believing that the statement was probably false.

As interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the statute is directed against false statements of fact.  It is not intended to prevent criticism of candidates for office or to prevent unfavorable deductions or inferences derived from a candidate’s conduct.[27]  It does not reach criticism which is merely unfair or unjust.  It does reach false statements of specific facts.[28]

The statement at issue in this matter is, “My opponent failed to remove the trailers and restrict the business when he was Assistant Fillmore County Attorney.”  The Complainant argued that the statement is false because it implies that he was aware of the improper storage of the semi-truck trailers when he was an Assistant County Attorney but failed to do anything about it.  The Complainant maintained that he had no knowledge of Mr. Moulton’s non-compliance with zoning laws while he was an Assistant County Attorney, and he pointed out that he left the County Attorney’s Office more than one year before the Fillmore County zoning administrator first notified Mr. Moulton of his potential zoning violations.  The Complainant asserted that it is false for the Respondent to suggest that the Complainant failed to correct a problem that only came to the attention of the County Attorney’s Office one year after the Complainant left.

The statement in Mr. Corson’s advertisement does imply that
Mr. Herendeen was aware of the zoning violations occurring on the Moulton property while he served as an Assistant County Attorney and that he failed to take action to correct the problem.  The evidence at the hearing, however, established that Mr. Herendeen did not know that a violation of the zoning laws was occurring.  Clearly it was the Respondent’s intent to suggest that the Complainant had done nothing to correct a controversial zoning problem, when in fact the problem came to light after the Complainant had left the Fillmore County Attorney’s Office.  To that extent, the statement is intentionally misleading, incomplete and unfair.  However, Minn. Stat. § 211B.06 is directed at false statements of fact and not against unfavorable implications or inferences based on fact, even if those inferences are extreme or illogical.[29]  Minnesota’s appellate courts have repeatedly held that the statute is not broad enough to prohibit incomplete and unfair campaign statements, even those that are clearly misleading.[30]  Instead, prohibited statements must be proven to be factually false by clear and convincing evidence. 

Here, the statement that Mr. Herendeen failed to remove the trailers or restrict Mr. Moulton’s business when he was an Assistant Fillmore County Attorney is not false.  Mr. Moulton has been operating his business and storing semi-truck trailers on his property since 1989.  Mr. Herendeen was an Assistant Fillmore County Attorney from 1997 until January 16, 2003.  It is true that during his tenure as an Assistant Fillmore County Attorney, Mr. Herendeen did not remove the trailers or restrict Mr. Moulton’s business.  Although the evidence in the record was sufficient to establish probable cause and to allow Mr. Herendeen to proceed with his case, the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statement is a false statement of fact.  Accordingly, the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint at the close of the Complainant’s case was granted.  

Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 211B.36, subd. 3, the assigned panel may order a Complainant to pay the Respondent’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the Office of Administrative Hearings if the judge or panel determines the complaint was frivolous.  A frivolous claim is one that is without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for a modification or reversal of existing law.[31]  Here the complaint was found to state a prima facie violation of Minn. Stat. § 211B.06 and, after a hearing, the Presiding Administrative Law Judge found probable cause to believe a violation occurred.  The fact that the Complainant was not able to meet his burden of proving the case by clear and convincing evidence does not render his complaint frivolous.  Therefore, Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

B.H.J., B.J.H., C.A.E.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



[1] Testimony of Herendeen.

[2] Testimony of Herendeen; Ex. D, Affidavit of Opat at ¶ 3; Ex. 33, Supplemental Affidavit of Craig at ¶ 3.

[3] Testimony of Herendeen.

[4] Ex. A, Affidavit of Craig at ¶ 3; Ex. 33, Supplemental Affidavit of Craig at ¶ 3; Ex. C.; Ex. J.

[5] Ex. 4, Affidavit of Moulton; Ex. 6.

[6] Ex. 4, Affidavit of Moulton; Ex. 20, Affidavit of Craig at 5.

[7] Ex. 20, Affidavit of Craig at ¶ 7.

[8] Ex. A, Affidavit of Craig at ¶ 4.

[9] Testimony of Herendeen.

[10] Ex. A, Affidavit of Craig at ¶ 5; Ex. 33, Supplemental Affidavit of Craig at ¶ 4.

[11] Ex. 33, Supplemental Affidavit of Craig at ¶ 4; Ex. E.

[12] Ex. H.

[13] Ex. I.

[14] Ex. J and Ex. 5.

[15] Ex. 20, Affidavit of Craig at ¶¶ 9 and 10; and Ex. J.

[16] Ex. J.

[17] Ex. J.

[18] Testimony of Herendeen.

[19] Ex. 1.

[20] Ex. B.

[21] See, Herendeen v. Corson, OAH Docket No. 4-6322-17617-CV (Order dated November 8, 2006).

[22] Minn. Stat. § 211B.01, subd. 2.

[23] Minn. Stat. § 211B.32, subd. 4.

[24] See, Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn., July 19, 2006).

[25] New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).

[26] 713 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2006).

[27] Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1981).

[28] Hawley v. Wallace, 137 Minn. 183, 186, 163 N.W. 127, 128 (1917); Bank v. Egan, 240 Minn. 192, 194, 60 N.W.2d 257, 259 (1953); Bundlie v. Christensen, 276 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. 1979) (interpreting predecessor statutes with similar language).

[29] Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn.1981).

[30] See, Bundlie v. Christensen, 276 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. 1979).

[31] Maddox v. Department of Human Services, 400 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn. App. 1987).