OAH 16-6010-20126-3
STATE OF
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FOR THE CITY OF
|
City of Petitioner, vs. Robert J.
Kroll and Wallace
M. Krueger, Respondents. |
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DISPOSITION |
This matter is before
Administrative Law Judge Manuel J. Cervantes (ALJ) on a motion for summary
disposition brought by the City of
Trina Chernos, Assistant
City Attorney, 333 South Seventh Street, Suite 300, Minneapolis, MN 55402-2453
appeared on behalf of the City of Minneapolis.
Ann Walther, Esq., Rice
Michels & Walther LLP, 206 East Bridge – Riverplace,
Based upon the record in
this matter, and for reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, the
Administrative Law Judge makes the following:
1.
The
Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Disposition is GRANTED.
2.
This
matter is DISMISSED.
Dated: March
30, 2009
s/Manuel
J. Cervantes
|
MANUEL
J. CERVANTES Administrative
Law Judge |
The issue in this case
is whether the City is obligated to defend and indemnify two police officers,
Robert Kroll and Wallace Krueger, in litigation based on their conduct on May
14, 2004. The ALJ and the City have
jurisdiction pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 14.55, 466.07, and Article 26 of the
Labor Agreement between the City and the Police Officers’ Federation of
Minneapolis. The Respondents were given
notice of the hearing in this matter and the City has complied with all
relevant procedural requirements.
On December 26, 2008,
the City served a Notice and Order for Hearing on Respondents by
On January 28, 2009, the
City served and filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Disposition
pursuant to Minn. R. 1400.6600 and requested a hearing on the motion, to be
heard by the ALJ on February 13, 2009.[3] The City submitted an affidavit supporting
its Motion for Summary Disposition.[4] The City requested Summary Disposition due to
Respondents’ acknowledgement that they were not acting in the performance of
the duties of their position and thereby, did not satisfy the requirements of
Minn. Stat. § 466.07.
On February 2, 2009,
Respondents’ counsel, Ann Walther, submitted an affidavit in opposition to the
City’s Motion for Summary Disposition.[5] Ms. Walther attested that the issue
Respondents would assert to the ALJ on February 13, 2009 would be:
[w]hether equity requires the City to defend and
indemnify Lt. Kroll and Sgt. Krueger in the Mahaffy lawsuit even though they
were off duty and were not acting in the performance of the duties of their
position at the time the incident giving rise to the lawsuit occurred.[6]
The Notice of Hearing
contains the following facts which Respondents do not dispute: the City of Minneapolis was served with a
Summons and Complaint in the matter of Jackson Mahaffy, et al. v. Robert J.
Kroll, et al. and City of Minneapolis on August 27, 2008; the lawsuit
references an altercation involving Robert J. Kroll and Wallace Krueger on May
14, 2004, in the City of Minneapolis; Robert J. Kroll and Wallace Krueger are
Minneapolis Peace Officers; on May 14, 2004, Kroll and Krueger were off duty,
not in uniform, and in Krueger’s personal vehicle; and the altercation involving Respondents on May
14, 2004 did not occur in the performance of Respondents’ duties as police
officers.
Summary Disposition Standard
Summary
disposition is the administrative equivalent of summary judgment. Summary disposition is appropriate where
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and one party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.[7] The Office of Administrative Hearings has
generally followed the summary judgment standards developed in judicial courts
in considering motions for summary disposition regarding contested case
matters.[8] A genuine issue is one that is not a sham or
frivolous. A material fact is a fact
whose resolution will affect the result or outcome of the case.[9]
The moving party has the
initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue concerning any
material fact. To successfully resist a
motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show that there are
specific facts in dispute that have a bearing on the outcome of the case.[10] When considering a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.[11] All doubts and factual inferences must be
resolved against the moving party.[12] If reasonable minds could differ as to the
import of the evidence, judgment as a matter of law should not be granted.[13] Summary judgment should only be granted in
those instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only
one conclusion.[14]
Analysis
Minn. Stat. § 466.07
specifies that subject to certain limitations set forth in section 466.04:
[A] municipality or an instrumentality of a municipality shall defend
and indemnify any of its officers and employees, whether elective or
appointive, for damages, including punitive damages, claimed or levied against
the officer or employee, provided that the officer or employee: (1) was acting in the performance of the
duties of the position; and (2) was not guilty of malfeasance in office,
willful neglect of duty, or bad faith.
Article 26 of the Labor
Agreement between the City and the Police Officer’s Federation of Minneapolis reflects
the statute and states, in pertinent part, as follows:
The City shall provide legal counsel to defend any employee against any
action or claim for damages, including punitive damages, subject to limitations
set forth in Minnesota Statutes § 466.07,
based on allegations related to any arrest or other act or omission by the
employee provided: the employee was
acting in the performance of the duties of his or her position; and was not
guilty of malfeasance in office, willful neglect of duty or bad faith.
Equitable Relief
The parties presented
arguments at the motion hearing on February 13, 2009. Respondents argued for equitable relief,
specifically, they framed the issue as:
whether equity requires the City to defend and indemnify Lt. Kroll and
Sgt. Krueger in the Mahaffey lawsuit
even though they were off duty and were not acting in the performance of the duties
of their position at the time the incident giving rise to the lawsuit occurred.[15]
The substance of
Respondent’s equitable argument is that the City is collaterally estopped from
taking a position in this case, that Respondent’s were not in the performance of their police duties on May 14, 2004,
which is at odds with the findings and conclusions of another City agency, the
Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) which Respondent’s claim
found that Respondent’s were on duty
on May 14, 2004 at the time of the altercation.
There are several problems with this argument.
First, it is Respondents
themselves that maintain that they were off duty and not performing their
duties as police officers on May 14, 2004.
Second, a review of the
CRA Findings of Fact contained in its Determination, dated August 7, 2006,
indicate that the Respondent’s were not
on duty on the date of the altercation, contrary to Respondent’s assertion.[16]
Likewise, the CRA found that neither of the Respondents identified
themselves as police officers to a victim “[n]or any other civilians present
during the [May 14, 2004] incident.”
Therefore, the ALJ finds little merit in this argument.
Third, assuming arguendo
that the facts were as claimed by Respondents that the CRA found that
Respondents were on duty on May 14,
and at odds with the City’s position in this case, equitable relief is not
something that may be granted by this tribunal.
The District Courts, which reside in the Judiciary branch, have inherent
equitable power, stemming from its genesis in common law.[17] This tribunal, the Office of Administrative
Hearings resides in the Executive branch, is a legislative statutory creation,
and is subject to the statutes conferring authority. Jurisdiction to preside over this matter is
found in Minn. Stat. §§ 14.55 and 466.07.
Nothing contained therein confers this tribunal with the authority to
grant equitable relief.
Under Minn. Stat. §
466.07, the City has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Respondents are not entitled to defense and indemnification. Respondents conceded a major element of Minn.
Stat. § 466.07, specifically, that they were not acting in the performance of
their duties on May 14, 2004. The City
has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that its decision not to
defend or indemnify the Respondents was proper. The conduct of Robert Kroll and Wallace
Krueger on May 14, 2004 did not occur in the performance of their duties as
Minneapolis Peace Officers. Therefore,
the City is entitled to the granting of its motion for summary
disposition. This matter is dismissed.
M. J. C.
[1] Notice and Order for Hearing.
[2] Scheduling Order.
[3] Notice of Motion and Motion.
[4] Chernos Affidavit.
[5] Walther Affidavit.
[6] Walther Affidavit, paragraph 5.
[7] Sauter v.
Sauter, 70 N.W.2d 351, 353 (
[8] See,
[9] Illinois
Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630, 634 (
[10] Thiele v.
Stitch, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (
[11] Ostendorf v.
Kenyon, 347 N.W.2d 834 (
[12] See, e.g.,
Thompson v.
[13]
[14]
[15] Paragraph 5, Walther Affidavit.
[16] Ex. M, p. 3, III, 3.
[17]
See,
generally, Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W. 2d 720 (