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12-3100-11269-2 |
STATE OF MINNESOTA
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
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Maurice F. Williams, Petitioner, v. Itasca County, Respondent. |
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION |
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before
Administrative Law Judge Steve M. Mihalchick on August 28 and 29, 1997, in the
County Board Room, Itasca County Courthouse, Grand Rapids, Minnesota.
Elizabeth A. Storaasli, Bye
Boyd Agnew, Ltd., 200 Sellwood Building, 202 West Superior Street, Duluth,
Minnesota 55802-1960, appeared on
behalf of Petitioner Maurice F. Williams.
Steven C. Fecker, Law Office of Steven C. Fecker, P.O. Box 206, Grand
Rapids, Minnesota 55744, appeared on
behalf of Respondent Itasca County. The
record was closed on October 22, 1997, upon receipt of the correspondence from
Petitioner that he would not be filing a reply brief.
NOTICE
This
Report is a recommendation, not a final decision. The Commissioner of Veterans Affairs will
make the final decision after a review of the record. The Commissioner may adopt, reject or modify the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions, and Recommendations.
Under Minn. Stat. § 14.61, the final decision of the Commissioner shall
not be made until this Report has been made available to the parties to the
proceeding for at least ten days. An
opportunity must be afforded to each party adversely affected by this Report to
file exceptions and present argument to the Commissioner. Parties should contact Bernie Melter,
Commissioner, Department of Veterans Affairs, 200 Veterans Service Building, 20
West 12th Street, St. Paul, Minnesota
55155, to ascertain the procedure for filing exceptions or presenting
argument.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether
Petitioner was removed from his position as a transfer station attendant as a
result of a good-faith abolition of the position.
2. Whether the
termination of Petitioner from his position as a temporary truck driver
constituted a removal under Minn. Stat. § 197.46.
3. Whether the
scoring system used by Respondent in filling the floater position Petitioner
applied for denied Petitioner veterans preference rights under Minn. Stat. §§
43A.11 and 197.455.
Based upon the record
herein, the Administrative Law Judge makes the following:
FINDINGS
OF FACT
1. Petitioner
was honorably discharged from the United States Army on March 25, 1971,
after having served more than one year on active duty. He was born May 20, 1948. Ex. 1, DD Form 214.
2. After his
discharge, Petitioner took police officer training and worked four years as a
police officer. He then worked at the
National Steel mine as a mechanic, welder, truck driver, and equipment
operator. He was laid off from that
position. He then went to school to
become an electrician and worked as an electrician.
3. In 1991,
Petitioner began working for the County as a sign painter. The evidence on how he came to be hired for
that position is somewhat confusing and not complete. It appears that he worked for the County through something called
Northstar Personnel in 1991 and 1992.
Ex. 18. In October 1992, the
County posted the position of landfill operator on a promotional basis. Petitioner applied for that position, but
his application was rejected in a letter of November 6, 1992, from Robert R.
Olson, Coordinator/Human Resources Director.
The rejection was based on the County's nepotism policy because
Petitioner is the nephew of a person who was at that time a County
Commissioner. Ex. 16. At about the same time, the County decided
to terminate Petitioner at the end of his probationary period. Both issues went to mediation, then
arbitration.[1] The Arbitrator awarded Petitioner the
landfill attendant position and back pay and benefits back to December 2, 1992,
the date the grievance was filed. Ex.
17; Testimony of Olson.
4. When
Petitioner began working at the Itasca County landfill, he was known as a
landfill operator or attendant. At some
point in time, the position was renamed transfer station attendant. That change in title apparently was
reflective of the change in function of the landfill to a transfer station used
more for the collection, sorting, and shipping of waste and recyclables, rather
than simply landfilling them.
Petitioner's job duties at the landfill evolved over time, but generally
consisted of greeting people who drove in with their refuse, determining the
amount of the charge and charging them by punching their tickets or preparing
bills, weighing contractor garbage trucks in and out, directing disposal of
waste, operating a pickup truck, and operating a "hook" truck that
was used for moving canisters.
Testimony of Olson, Testimony of Willliams; Ex. 5.
5. There was
one other transfer station attendant employed at the landfill, Kathy
Leeseberg. In addition, two equipment
operators worked there. The transfer
station attendant positions were members of AFSME Local 1626, the
"Courthouse Unit", which included the clerical staff at the
courthouse, maintenance staff at the courthouse, and the transfer station
attendants at the landfill. The
equipment operator positions were in AFSME Local 1452, the "Road and
Bridge Unit", which generally included the equipment operators in the Road
and Bridge Department. Testimony of
Olson, Exs. 26 and 27.
6. On June
13, 1994, Petitioner requested that a job evaluation be done of the transfer
station attendant position. He did so
because a number of changes had taken place in the job. They had a new building and scale to
maintain and the operation had been computerized so they now had to do computer
entry. Because Leeseberg was on light
duty, Petitioner had to do more of the heavy work and the maintenance work
around the landfill site. Testimony of
Williams, Ex. 20. Leeseberg told
Petitioner that she did not want the job re-evaluated because she did not feel
they were entitled to a raise.
Testimony of Leeseberg. The job
evaluation resulted in a change in the job from grade 4 to grade 2, a reduction
in pay. That resulted in Petitioner's
and Leeseberg's pay being frozen until the new pay grades and step increases
exceeded their current salary. Ex.
21. On October 12, 1994, Petitioner appealed
the re-evaluation to Robert Olson, the Coordinator/Human Resources
Director. On October 17, 1994, Olson
notified Petitioner that the re-evaluation would stand until changes in the job
merited a new request for job re-evaluation.
Ex. 23.
7. In late
1995, the County Board began considering contracting out the landfill
operation, believing there was a potential for significant savings. The unions asked to be able to bid on the
proposal. That was done by the County's
own Road and Bridge Department proposing to operate the landfill under a
contract with the Solid Waste Department.
The County Board accepted that proposal. The proposal was worked out among the County and Locals 1626 and
1452. Its terms were incorporated in a
Letter of Understanding between the County and AFSME Council 65 and Locals 1626
and 1452. Ex. 6.
8. Under the
Letter of Understanding, the transfer station attendants came under the
supervision of the Road and Bridge Department.
Under the Letter of Understanding, the transfer station attendants would
continue to be covered by the Local 1626 contract, but could be assigned to
work as operators, attendants, or road and bridge maintenance workers by the
highway foreman and, likewise, Local 1452 employees who were restricted to limited
duty could be assigned to work in the transfer station attendant
positions. Ex. 6, ¶ 2. The Letter of Understanding provided that
any transfer station attendant assigned to work as a road and bridge
maintenance worker would be paid at the applicable rate in the Local 1452
contract, but would not accrue any Local 1452 seniority. It also provided that the transfer station
attendants would continue to be covered by the Local 1626 contract and would
accrue seniority under the Local 1626 contract only. Ex. 6, ¶¶ 1 and 3. This
arrangement allowed the County to save money because the County could assign
Road and Bridge employees on light duty to work at the landfill as transfer
station attendants and because it could assign one of the transfer station attendants
to other duties in the Road and Bridge Department. That saved the money that was previously used in keeping two
employees 40 hours per week at the landfill when only one was required to be
present at a time. The landfill was
open 62 or 63 hours per week. Testimony
of Olson, Testimony of Engstrom.
9. Under the
agreement, the general plan was to have Leeseberg work 40 hours per week at the
transfer station and for Petitioner to work 22 hours there, and the remainder
of his time at the Arbo garage. Ex. 31.
10. Gary
Barrett was the District 2 Road and Bridge foreman in charge of the Arbo
garage. Under the terms of the Letter
of Understanding, the transfer station attendants assigned to Arbo came under
his supervision and he was in charge of making work assignments. Beginning in March, 1996, just prior to the
signing of the Letter of Understanding, Barrett began assigning Petitioner Road
and Bridge work out of the Arbo garage.
He always made sure that the transfer station attendant position was filled,
usually with Leeseberg, or sometimes a Road and Bridge employee on light duty,
and then by Petitioner. He would assign
Petitioner to Road and Bridge duties for the remainder of his regular time. Testimony of Barrett, Engstrom and
Petitioner. From March through December
1996, Petitioner worked about half-time on Road and Bridge duties. Testimony of Barrett, Engstrom and
Petitioner.
11. While
working out of the Arbo garage, Petitioner performed various maintenance and
operator duties. He operated a chain
saw cutting brush, fed brush into a chipper, ran a loader, drove a pickup
truck, drove a tandem dump truck, and operated mowers, loaders, and
sanders. He plowed snow with trucks and
with graders, steamed culverts, sealed cracks in blacktop, patched blacktop,
pulled beaver dams out of culverts, and did welding, clean-up and miscellaneous
jobs around the garage. His duties were
equivalent to those of a position called "floater" in the Road and
Bridge Department. Petitioner performed
well in the position and Barrett and Engstrom considered him qualified to be a
floater.
12. In mid
1996, the County Board again sought bids to contract out the landfill
operation. It received proposals and
voted to accept the proposal of Solid Waste Integrated Systems, L.P.
(SWIS). The County then entered into
negotiations to finalize the agreement with SWIS. It was estimated that the agreement would produce savings of
about $400,000 per year over the County operating the landfill. Under the agreement, SWIS would not be
employing the County's employees who worked at the landfill. Testimony of Olson.
13. By letter
of October 22, 1996, the County Board formally notified AFSME Council 6 of its
decision to enter into an agreement with SWIS, stating that it would result in
the elimination of the positions currently assigned to the transfer station and
possible layoff of the employees. It
offered to meet with the unions to discuss the matter. Ex. 8.
By letter of November 1, 1996, the Assistant Director of Council 65 notified
the Chairman of the County Board that it considered the decision to contract
out the transfer station operation to be a violation of the collective
bargaining agreements. The letter
enclosed two grievances, one filed by Local 1626 and one filed by Local 1452,
grieving the action by the County. Ex.
9.
14. By letter
of November 6, 1996, Petitioner was notified that the County intended to lay
him off because the contracting out of the landfill operation to SWIS would
result in the elimination of the Local 1626 positions at the transfer
station. The notice advised Petitioner
of his right under the Local 1626 collective bargaining agreement to bump any
less senior person in Local 1626 from position for which he was qualified. It also contained the following notice
regarding veterans preference rights:
The Minnesota Veterans Preference Act, Minn. Stat. Sec.
197.66, [sic] provides that if you are a veteran, separated from military
service under honorable conditions, you have the right to request a hearing
regarding your layoff. In order to
request a hearing you must submit a written request, either by mail or personal
service, within sixty (60) days of receipt of this notice, addressed as
follows:
Mr. Robert Olson
Itasca County Coordinator/
Human Resources Director
Itasca County Courthouse
123 4th St NE
Grand Rapids, MN
55744-2600
The failure to request a hearing within the 60 day period
shall constitute a waiver of the right to a hearing. Your layoff will be effective upon expiration of the 60 day
period for requesting a hearing or upon conclusion of a hearing upholding the
layoff, whichever occurs first. You
will be continued in paid status until your layoff is effective.
Ex. 4. Petitioner
requested information about his bumping rights and was provided with a copy of
the Local 1626 seniority list, job descriptions of those persons with less
seniority, and a blank job application.
He was asked to submit the job application for the job he wanted to bump
into. Ex. 7.
15. During
November 1996, Engstrom developed a proposal in an effort to resolve the union
grievances in a manner that would also allow the four employees then working at
the transfer station to remain employed by the County. The proposal called for the creation of two
grade 7 equipment operators in Local 1452, a grade 3 floater position in Local
1452, and a solid waste site manager/administrative assistant position in Local
1626. The idea was that the displaced
equipment operators could bump into the two new grade 7 operator positions,
Petitioner would be placed in the grade 3 floater position in Local 1452, and
Leeseberg would be placed in the new light duty solid waste site
manager/administrative assistant position in Local 1626. The matter was discussed at the November 18,
1996, meeting of the Public Works Committee of the County Board and again at
the November 26, 1996, meeting of the full County Board. The matter was tabled at that meeting and
referred back to the Public Works Committee.
Ex. 10.
16. On November
27, 1996, the County Board met with the unions for a step 3 grievance meeting
regarding the contracting out grievances.
The Council 65 Assistant Director reiterated the union's position that
the contracting out prior to negotiating with the unions had been a contract
violation and that not only would the unions force a grievance, but they would
also sue the County. The County's
negotiator suggested that the parties attempt to resolve the matter by dealing with
the employee issues. Ultimately, the
parties reached a tentative resolution of the grievance, which was described in
the minutes of the meeting as follows:
In an attempt to settle this grievance, the Board proposed
to create two (2) grade 7 operator positions, one (1) grade 3 floater position,
and one (1) light duty maintenance position.
The grade 7 positions would replace the two operator positions at the
landfill currently held by 1452 employees.
The floater position would be filled by Maurice Williams assuming he
qualified for the position.
Mr. Williams would be allowed to transfer from Local 1626 to Local
1452 and carry service credit (not seniority) for the purposes of
benefits. The light duty maintenance
position would be created for Kathy Leeseburg.
The County Engineer budgeted for the three positions in Road &
Bridge; however, if this proposal is approved, a transfer of funds from Solid
Waste to maintenance would be required!
The union tentatively agreed to the County proposal provided
that the County accept the last offer (negotiations) submitted by Locals 1626
and 580.
The Board then directed their negotiator to draft the
settlement offer and submit it to the unions.
Ex. 11. Although Engstrom had
been willing simply to place Petitioner as a floater without testing because he
was satisfied with his ability to perform the job, Local 1452 had raised the
issue of testing. Engstrom then
recommended to the Board that they go along with a testing requirement and do a
pass/fail test in November or December.
Testimony of Engstrom.
17. On
December 6, 1996, the negotiator submitted offer letters for each of the locals
to the Council 65 Assistant Director.
Ex. 12. Regarding Petitioner,
the proposal was that the County would create an additional grade 3 floater
position within Local 1452 that would be filled by the normal posting and
bumping procedures and that after that process was completed, the remaining
unfilled floater position would be offered to Petitioner provided he
demonstrated to the County's satisfaction, based on testing, that he was
qualified for the position.
18. The matter
came back before the County Board on December 30, 1996. At that time, Engstrom brought a
recommendation to the Board that included creating the two grade 7 positions
for the two Local 1452 employees and the light duty building maintenance
position in the courthouse for Leeseberg.
Instead of creating the grade 3 floater position in 1452 for Petitioner,
the recommendation was for a truck/trailer operator position in the Juvenile
Probation Department in Local 1626. Ex.
15. However, at the time he made the
presentation to the Board, Engstrom stated that there was no funding for the
position in the Juvenile Probation Department and therefore staff had to
withdraw that recommendation. Instead,
he recommended the creation of either a survey crew chief position in Local
1626 or a low-boy tractor/trailer operator position in Local 1452. Either option would allow Petitioner
ultimately to be placed in a vacant floater position in Local 1452. Ex. 30 at 2-4. Either arrangement would have fulfilled the tentative agreement
and would have required Petitioner to pass a pass/fail test for the floater
position.
19. The Board
adopted the recommendations for the two Local 1452 employees and for
Leeseberg. As they began to act on the
recommendation regarding the position for Petitioner, David Mortenson,
president of Local 1452, spoke up and stated that his local wanted Petitioner
to be tested under the regular testing procedures and not be allowed to have a
separate pass/fail test. The following
discussion ensued:
COMMISSIONER
HUJU: That's the position of the
bargaining unit?
MR.
MORTENSON: That's the position of the
bargaining unit is that they be tested under regular -- in regular testing
procedures, not setting up special tests for individual testing. The way and reason you do that is you go and
run 20 people through the test or however many applicants you got and you get
your best applicant and you grade them according to one, two, three, and they
get hired off that list in that order.
When I originally come up with that number one -- that number one
decision of the truck and trailer operator is because the wood crew could use
the extra help right now and stuff and are behind, and I figured that he would
just naturally go in and apply and test out in the spring when we hold the
testing anyway 'cause we got to make an eligibility list.
COMMISSIONER
BRAFORD: I think that's a fair way to
do it.
MR.
ENGSTROM: One of our reasons for
recommending against waiting until normal testing would be let's just say that
the individual comes in fifth, what do we do with that individual between now
and the time that he reaches the place on the eligibility list to be hired as
an equipment operator? Do you have any
recommendations for that?
MR.
MORTENSON: I don't have a
recommendation for that, but that's tied into issues with our group is that
that you get qualified applicants into that job, the position itself. It's nothing against the person but we
wholeheartedly take the position for our group and everything else, it's just
we've had a few threats from outside -- outside the group that with these
special tests you've got people left on your list below ten right now. I think some of the commissioners may have
heard the same concerns from some people out there, and I don't want it to be
our group who's got to oppose it for the fact that we don't want to be drugged
into some kind of lawsuit from somebody who didn't get a job. All of a sudden you set up a different
testing procedure for this one person, just to pull him in, it looks really
bad. We've researched it through an attorney
and everything else that we need to be as distant from that, the testing part
of that, as possible for that reason.
MR.
OLSON: Mr. Chairman, and I spoke with
Mr. Fecker this morning on this very issue and Mr. Fecker recommends strongly
that you live up to the agreement that you proposed the day that we had the
Step Two grievance, and it was agreeable at that time that the individual would
be tested. If the union does not wish
to be part of the testing process, which I hear them say, then they should let
us proceed with our testing the way that Mr. Engstrom was going to set it up
and we proceed on that basis, and that's what Mr. Fecker is strongly
recommending that you do.
Ex. 30 at 7-10.
Olson and Engstrom continued to recommend that the Board adopt the
tentative agreement that would allow Petitioner to be placed into the floater
position on the basis of a pass/fail test.
However, the Board ultimately decided that it would adopt the union
position that it was most fair to the other applicants for the floater position
that Petitioner be required to, in effect, simply apply for the job like
everyone else, going through the normal testing procedure and having no
preference on the hiring list. For the
interim, the Board was able to allocate funding for the temporary position in
the Juvenile Probation Department driving a truck, making wood deliveries. Olson then suggested that Petitioner's
agreement to the arrangement was necessary because, as the Board recognized, it
could mean that Petitioner would eventually be laid off. Ex. 30 at 21. That was acceptable to the Board because they felt that
Petitioner still had bumping rights when the temporary job ended. Ex. 30 at 22. Petitioner was not present at the Board meeting, but the
presidents of both locals were and agreed that this solution would resolve the
grievances. The Board then adopted a
resolution, creating the truck/trailer operator position in Local 1626 in the
Juvenile Probation Department for Petitioner on a temporary basis until the
spring testing for a grade 3 floater position was given. A revised grievance settlement agreement
with Local 1626 was drafted by the negotiator in a letter dated January 15,
1997, to the Council 65 Assistant Director.
Ex. 14. With regard to
Petitioner, the agreement stated:
Maurice
Williams: Maurice Williams will be
placed into a temporary position as a truck driver in the firewood program of
the Probation/Parole Department. This
temporary position is within Local 1626 and, based on agreement with the Union,
may be filled by Maurice Williams without going through the contractual posting
procedure.
During
the time of Spring breakup, the County Road and Bridge Department will be
taking applications and testing in order to establish a Grade 3 floater
eligibility list. Maurice Williams may,
if he so elects, apply and be tested for the position. If as a result of the testing, Maurice
Williams is first on the eligibility register, the County will at that time
offer Maurice Williams a Grade 3 floater position, subject to the usual
preplacement screening and satisfactory reference check responses. If Maurice Williams is not first on the
eligibility list (or high enough on the eligibility list to be offered a
position if there is more than one vacancy in a Grade 3 floater position), then
his name shall remain on the eligibility list but the County shall not be
obligated to create a Grade 3 floater position to offer to him. If Maurice Williams is not placed in a Grade
3 floater position as a result of this procedure and the temporary truck driver
position in Probation/Parole is eliminated, Maurice Williams will be entitled
to exercise his seniority/bumping rights within Local 1626 under the Local 1626
contract.
The agreement was signed by the Local 1626 president, the
Council 65 Assistant Director, Leeseberg and Petitioner.
18. On December 31, 1996, Petitioner and
Leeseberg met with Peggy Clayton, the County human resources officer, to go
over the paperwork for their new positions.
At that time, Clayton spoke to Petitioner about an application he had
dropped off the previous day to bump into the position of court services crew
foreman. She told him that they would
need a letter stating his intent to bump into the position. He wanted to know how the pay compared to his
temporary job, but she was not yet able to tell him because the temporary position
had not yet been evaluated.
19. On January 2, 1997, Petitioner began
working as a truck driver for the Probation Department. The Probation Department had a work program
for juvenile offenders that was based on making up firewood bundles from scrap
lumber and selling it. Petitioner's
duties were primarily driving a truck to pick up and deliver the firewood. He also assisted with cutting and bundling
the firewood and had some clerical duties.
Ex. 33.
20. On January 9, 1997, Clayton contacted
Petitioner because she had not received a letter from him stating whether he
wanted to bump into the court services crew foreman position. She informed him, however, that because he
had received his lay off notice November 6, 1996, any application for bumping
would have had to have been 30 days from that date and, since his application
for the crew foreman had been received on December 30, 1996, it was not
timely. Ex. 39.
21. The County hires two or three floaters
each year. It opened the floater
position for applications from February 10 to February 24, 1997. Ex. 37.
Petitioner submitted an application.
Ex. 35.
22. The applications were graded by Clayton
using an experience and training rating form that had been used for a number of
years. Testimony of Clayton; Ex.
34. The rating form sets forth three
minimum requirements of (1) high school graduation equivalent, (2) experience
in operation and maintenance of highway construction equipment or graduation
from an appropriate vocational-technical school, and (3) possession of a Class
B license. For each of the minimum
requirements, 23.34 points is awarded, yielding a total minimum point score of
70. Additional "bonus" points
are awarded for the following items:
· 12
points for a Class A commercial license
· Up
to 10 additional points for additional years of experience beyond the minimum
· Up
to 7 points for previous experience working on listed types of heavy
equipment
· Up
to 5 points for experience as a truck driver in a government street agency or highway department.
The possible 34 bonus points are adjusted by a multiplier of
30/34 that scales the bonus points to an actual maximum of 30. (Actually, the County uses a cumbersome
formula that produces the same result.)
Thus, the total possible is 100 points.
To that may be added the five or ten veterans preference points to reach
the total experience and training rating.
Testimony of Clayton.
18. Using Petitioner's application, Clayton
awarded Petitioner the 70 points for the minimum qualifications, 12 bonus
points for a Class A commercial license, 10 points for additional years of
experience in operation and maintenance of highway construction equipment and 5
points for operating five of the seven types of heavy equipment listed. Thus, he received 27 bonus points. His total raw score of 97 was then adjusted
to a total of 93.82. To that, 5 points
for veterans preference was added, giving him a final score of 98.82.
19. Clayton did not award Petitioner any bonus
points for work experience as a truck driver within a government street agency
or highway department. She did so
despite the fact that he had listed on his application that he worked as a
truck driver for Probation Department because he had listed his starting date
as May 1992, which she considered to be obviously a wrong date, despite the
fact that that was his seniority date with the County and she knew exactly the
date that he had started working as a truck driver making wood deliveries. She also didn't provide him any credit for
the time he had been driving a truck while employed by the County as a transfer
station attendant, nor for the nine months of 1996 he worked at the Arbo
garage. During the time at Arbo,
Petitioner gained several months of experience as a truck driver within a
government street agency or highway department and would have been entitled to
two points. Petitioner properly marked
his experience at truck driving in the spaces indicated on the form. Ex. 35, pg. 3.
20. After scoring all the applications for the
floater position, a list was produced of the applicants ranked by score. The high score was 109.00, the second score
was 100.59, the third score was 99.71, and then eight applicants, including
Petitioner, were tied at 98.82. The top
13 applicants were all veterans. Ex.
37. (The score of 109.00 is impossible
under the formula used by the County, even if five or ten veterans preference
points are included.)
21. The second step of the hiring process for
the floater position was the road test.
The top 31 applicants on the experience and training rating were
certified to take the road test. Petitioner
was one of those. Testimony of
Clayton. The applicants taking that portion
of the test drove four pieces of equipment and were graded on their
performance. The possible score on each
was 60, for a total possible of 240.
Petitioner scored 159 points on the road test. His score on operating the "cat" was a relatively low 29. Respondent's Memo, Ex. 1. The highest score was 209 points and
Petitioner's score on the road test ranked him 23rd out of the 30 scores
reported. The lowest reported score was
121. The person who ranked the highest
on the experience and training rating with the score of 109 did not appear for
the road test. Ex. 37.
22. The score from the experience and training
rating was added to the road test score and the applicants were then
ranked. Petitioner's combined score was
257.71, which ranked him 22nd on the list.
The top score was 307.82. Ex.
37. The top 12 finalists were then
interviewed for the position. Of those,
five were veterans. There is no
requirement that the first person on the list be hired. Petitioner was not interviewed, but remains
on the eligibility roster for one year.
Testimony of Olson, Ex. 37.
23. By letter of May 6, 1997, from Olson,
Petitioner was notified of the County's intention to lay him off from
employment effective June 10, 1997. The
notice recited the fact that he had been placed in a temporary position as a
truck driver until the eligibility list for equipment operator was established
and that he would be offered a position as a Grade 3 floater if he placed first
on the list and that on April 29, 1997, the eligibility list was established
and he was not first on the list nor high enough on the list to be offered a
position. The letter provided
Petitioner notice that under the Local 1626 collective bargaining agreement, he
had a right to bump less senior persons from positions in Local 1626 for which
he was qualified and had five days to exercise that right. It also provided him the following notice of
his veterans preference rights as follows:
If you are a veteran as defined by Minn. Stat. Sec 197.447,
you may have certain rights relating to your layoff under the Veterans
Preference Act (Minn. Stat. 197.46 and .481).
Pursuant to the Act, you have the right to either petition the District
Court for a writ of mandamus or the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs to determine
whether the action taken was in good faith.
If you wish to pursue either of these remedies, you must do
so within 60 days of receipt of this notice.
Your failure to do so within 60 days shall constitute a waiver of your
rights to contest your layoff under the Veterans Preference Act. In order to request a hearing you must
submit a written request, addressed as follows:
Mr. Robert
Olson
Itasca
County Coordinator
Itasca
County Courthouse
123 4th St
NE
Grand
Rapids, MN 55744-2600
The failure to request a hearing within the 60 day period
shall constitute a waiver of the right to a hearing. As a veteran, your layoff will be effective upon expiration of
the 60 day period for requesting a hearing or upon conclusion of a hearing
upholding the layoff, whichever occurs first.
Ex. 3. While the
notice mentioned the writ of mandamus and the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs,
it incorrectly stated that such appeals must be made to the County.
24. Petitioner submitted a few requests for
bumping, but was ultimately determined not to be qualified for any of the
positions occupied by less senior persons in Local 1626. Testimony of Petitioner, Olson, Clayton; Ex.
32.
25. On June 16, 1997, Petitioner filed a
letter with Olson requesting a hearing under the Veterans Preference Act to
contest his lay off. Ex. 2. On July 10, 1997, Petitioner filed a
Petition for Relief with the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs. Ex. 1.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Administrative Law Judge makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS
1. The
Administrative Law Judge and the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs have
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 14.50 and 197.481.
2. Petitioner
is an honorably discharged veteran as defined by Minn. Stat. § 197.447 and
entitled to the protections of the Veterans Preference Act at Minn. Stat. §§
43A.11, 197.455 and 197.46.
3. At the end
of 1996, Petitioner was working in the position of transfer station attendant
at the landfill with temporary assignments to the Road and Bridge
Department. His position was within
Local 1626. Pursuant to the terms of
the Letter of Understanding between the County and Locals 1626 and 1452,
Petitioner's temporary assignments to work for the Road and Bridge Department
did not qualify him as a floater in that department or as a member of Local
1452 in any way.
4. When the
County Board abolished the four positions at the landfill, including
Petitioner's, and contracted out the operation of the landfill to a private
party, the abolition of positions was done for legitimate reasons and in good
faith. Therefore, the abolition of
Petitioner's position did not violate Petitioner's rights under Minn. Stat. §
197.46.
5. The
November 6, 1996, Notice of Layoff/Veterans Preference Rights provided to
Petitioner in connection with the abolition of his position was inadequate in
two aspects. It mistakenly referred to
Minn. Stat. § 197.66 rather than Minn. Stat. § 197.46 and it failed to advise
him of his right to appeal the abolition of his position by a writ of
mandamus to the District Court or a petition to the Commissioner of
Veterans Affairs. Those defects are
inconsequential at this point, however, because Petitioner has filed a petition
with the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs, which is the subject of this
proceeding.
6. The County
had no legal obligation under the Veterans Preference Act to provide Petitioner
with any replacement employment beyond the bumping rights he had under the
Local 1626 collective bargaining agreement.
Therefore, there was no violation of Petitioner's veterans preference
rights under Minn. Stat. § 197.46 with regard to the County's offer to place
him in a temporary truck driver position while creating permanent positions for
the other three landfill employees.
7. The
temporary truck driver position created for Petitioner pending the testing for
the equipment operator floater position was specifically created to end upon
the testing being completed. Therefore,
the termination of that position at that time was not a removal of Petitioner
within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 197.46, and did not violate his rights
thereunder.
8. The
County's two-tier scoring system for the floater position is not a
"100-point" system that allows the proper application of veterans
preference points as required by Minn. Stat. § 43A.11 and Hall v. City of
Champlin, 463 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1990).
9. The
appropriate remedy for the violation of Petitioner's veterans preference rights
is to require that the County appoint Petitioner as Grade 3 equipment operator
in a floater position and provide him back pay, benefits, and seniority as if he had been appointed to that position
effective June 10, 1997.
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions, the Administrative
Law Judge makes the following:
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner of
Veterans Affairs order that:
1. The Petition
of Maurice F. Williams be GRANTED as follows.
2. Respondent Itasca
County shall appoint Petitioner to a Grade 3 equipment operator floater
position in its Road and Bridge Department.
3. Respondent
Itasca County shall pay Petitioner back pay and provide him with all benefits
and seniority as if appointed to that position June 10, 1997. Any income or re-employment benefits
received by Petitioner for the period of June 10, 1997, to appointment shall be
deducted. Interest at the rate of 6 percent
per annum shall be paid on all back pay and cash benefits from the date due to
the date of payment.
4. Respondent
Itasca County shall comply with the requirements of Minn. Stat. §§ 43A.11,
197.455 and 197.46 in the future.
|
Dated
this |
18th |
day
of |
November |
1997. |
|
|
|
STEVE M. MIHALCHICK |
|
Administrative Law Judge |
Reported:
Tape recorded, 8 tapes
Not transcribed
NOTICE
Under to Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 1, the agency is
required to serve its final decision upon each party and the Administrative Law
Judge by first class mail or as otherwise provided by law.
MEMORANDUM
Statutory Background
Many assertions regarding
veterans rights have been made by the parties in this matter. In Minnesota, the Veterans Preference Act
has existed since the time of the Civil War.
State ex rel. Cowden v. Miller, 66 Minn. 90, 68 N.W. 732
(1896) (holding Laws 1887, c. 149, Gen.St. 1894, § 8041, giving preference in
appointment and employment of public officers to honorably discharged Union
soldiers and sailors, to be constitutional).
Veterans preference rights in hiring have been modified over the
years. Until 1975, veterans had an
"absolute" preference over nonveterans in employment in political
subdivisions. Any qualified veteran was
required to be appointed or promoted before any nonveteran. Minn. Stat. § 197.45 (1974). That was changed by Laws of Minn. 1975, ch.
45, which repealed Minn. Stat. § 197.45 (1974) and made the point system of the
state's civil service system applicable to political subdivisions. The statute now provides, in relevant part:
43A.11 Veteran's preference.
Subdivision 1. Creation. Recognizing that training and experience in
the military services of the government and loyalty and sacrifice for the
government are qualifications of merit which cannot be readily assessed by
examination, a veteran's preference shall be available pursuant to this section
to a veteran as defined in section 197.447.
. . .
Subd. 3. Nondisabled
veteran's credit. There shall be
added to the competitive open examination rating of a nondisabled veteran, who
so elects, a credit of five points provided that the veteran obtained a passing
rating on the examination without the addition of the credit points.
Subd. 4. Disabled
veteran's credit. There shall be
added to the competitive open examination rating of a disabled veteran, who so
elects, a credit of ten points provided that the veteran obtained a passing
rating on the examination without the addition of the credit points. . . .
Subd. 6. Preference
for spouses. A preference available
pursuant to this section may be used by the surviving spouse of a deceased
veteran and by the spouse of a disabled veteran who because of the disability
is unable to qualify.
Subd. 7. Ranking of
veterans. An eligible with a rating
augmented by veteran's preference shall be entered on an eligible list ahead of
a nonveteran with the same rating.
Subd. 8. Notification. A governmental agency when notifying
eligibles that they have passed examinations shall show the final examination
ratings preference credits and shall notify eligibles that they may elect to
use veteran's preference to augment passing ratings.
Subd. 9. Rejection;
explanation. If the appointing
authority rejects a certified eligible who has received veteran's preference,
the appointing authority shall notify the eligible in writing of the reasons
for the rejection.
At
the time that the foregoing changes were made, the state civil service law was
modified to require the certification of the first 10 names on an eligibility
list to the appointing authority, who then had to make the appointment from
those 10 eligibles. Laws of Minn. 1975,
ch. 45, § 1, subd. 3. That provision
has been amended and now provides for the certification of 20 names, plus those
having the same score as the 20th person certified. Minn. Stat. § 43A.13, subd. 4.
In Hall v. City of Champlin,
463 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1990), the Supreme Court held that the 1975 changes did
not repeal veterans preference for those political subdivisions that did not
have civil service systems as the City of Champlin and the League of Minnesota
Cities had argued. Instead, it held
that the statute required a uniform policy applicable to all veterans
throughout the state and that a 100-point based hiring system was necessary to
the uniform application and intended effect of the law. The court stated:
. . . We hold that political subdivisions of the state must adapt
their hiring systems to a 100-point rating system to enable the allocation of
veterans preference points. Our
decision today does not unduly restrict the discretion granted by the
legislature to cities that choose to operate under a personnel ordinance. It does not require political subdivisions
to adopt any particular form of hiring system.
They need not adopt civil service systems nor need they extensively
revise hiring processes and administer formal written examinations for all
positions subject to veterans preference.
A local appointing authority may administer any type of evaluation as
long as it is based on criteria capable of being reduced to 100-point rating
system. The 100-point rating system
will apply to all positions except those specifically exempted from the
veterans preference act by Minn. Stat. Sec. 197.46.
With regard to removal
of veterans, Minn. Stat. § 197.46 provides, in relevant part:
Any person whose rights may be in any way prejudiced contrary to
any of the provisions of this section, shall be entitled to a writ of mandamus
to remedy the wrong. No person holding
a position by appointment or employment in the several counties, cities, towns,
school districts and all other political subdivisions in the state, who is a
veteran separated from the military service under honorable conditions, shall
be removed from such position or employment except for incompetency or
misconduct shown after a hearing, upon due notice, upon stated charges, in
writing.
Any veteran who has been notified of the intent to discharge the
veteran from an appointed position or employment pursuant to this section shall
be notified in writing of such intent to discharge and of the veteran's right
to request a hearing within 60 days of receipt of the notice of intent to
discharge. The failure of a veteran to
request a hearing within the provided 60-day period shall constitute a waiver
of the right to a hearing. Such failure
shall also waive all other available legal remedies for reinstatement.
Request for a hearing concerning such a discharge shall be made
in writing and submitted by mail or personal service to the employment office
of the concerned employer or other appropriate office or person.
. . .
All
officers, boards, commissions, and employees shall conform to, comply with, and
aid in all proper ways in carrying into effect the provisions of section
197.455 and this section notwithstanding any laws, charter provisions,
ordinances or rules to the contrary.
Any willful violation of such sections by officers, officials, or
employees is a misdemeanor.
The substantive requirements of this statute as
applied to political subdivisions have remained unchanged for over 100
years. See, Johnson v. Pugh,
152 Minn. 437, 189 N.W. 257 (1922).
Provisions regarding procedures have been added over the years.
Petitioner's Removal
Respondent argues that it
abolished Petitioner's position of transfer station attendant in good faith and
thus, under State Ex Rel. Boyd v. Matson, 155 Minn. 137, 1193
N.W.30 (1923), there is no violation of Minn. Stat. § 197.46. The Administrative Law Judge agrees. In Boyd it was held that the
veterans preference law did not prevent municipal employee officials from abolishing
an office or a position held by a veteran if the action is taken in good faith
and is not a mere subterfuge to oust the veteran from his position. It also held that the absolute preference
accorded to veterans in employment and promotion over other applicants also
implied a right to be retained in employment over nonveterans when equivalent
positions are abolished.
The County Board made a good
faith, legitimate business decision to contract out operation of the landfill
to save approximately $400,000 per year.
The County took the action publicly, with notice to the effected unions
and with the original intent to provide alternative employment for the four
employees who would be put out of work by the action.
Petitioner argues that the
layoff of Petitioner was not in good faith.
For evidence of lack of good faith, Petitioner cites the fact that the
County attempted to terminate his employment shortly after he was hired and
rejected his application for promotion to landfill attendant, both of which actions
were reversed in arbitration. He cites
the fact that the County reduced the transfer station attendant classification
through the evaluation he requested, resulting in a freeze in pay throughout
his entire employment. He states the
County used him as a temporary equipment operator in the Road and Bridge
Department in order to be able to assign Local 1452 employees to work at the
landfill in light duty positions. He
also presented testimony that he felt Olson was unhappy with him because of the
early arbitration, some complaints regarding Petitioner's performance and
Olson's actions toward him regarding the proposed appointment to a floater
position. The Administrative Law Judge
does not see any evidence of bad faith by the County in any of those actions,
even if they did occur. It is clear
that the contracting out of the landfill operation had nothing to do with
Petitioner. It was the cost of the
operation of the landfill that the County Board was concerned with. Moreover, at the December 30, 1996 Board
meeting, Olson urged the Board to adopt the terms of the tentative agreement
that would have allowed Petitioner to be employed in the floater position with
only a pass/fail test.
Petitioner also points to
the fact that there was no discussion at the County Board meeting of December
30, 1996, or any other time, that any consideration should be given to
Petitioner's veterans preference rights and that the Board was most concerned
with addressing Local 1452's concerns about testing. There is some legitimacy to that argument, but the fact remains
that the decision to abolish the landfill positions had already been made in
good faith and the discussion on December 30, 1996, involved finding new
employment for the four employees. None
of the events that occurred on December 30, 1996, prove an absence of good
faith in the abolition of Petitioner's position.
Petitioner also argues that
the actual position he was working in at the end of 1996 was part-time transfer
station attendant and part-time floater.
He argues that by doing the work required of equipment operators in the
Road and Bridge Department, he fell within the definition of an employee within
Local 1452, the Road and Bridge unit.
But, in fact, his temporary work assignments in the Road and Bridge
Department were specifically the subject of the Letter of Understanding between
the County and the two locals. Under
that Letter of Understanding, Petitioner did not become an employee of the Road
and Bridge Department and did not acquire any seniority in Local 1452. Moreover, the work he performed there was
temporary. By terms of the Letter of
Understanding, it only applied while the County continued to operate the landfill. Thus, Petitioner remained a transfer station
attendant and his position was abolished at the end of 1996.
Petitioner was not treated
very fairly by the County Board when the County Board created permanent
positions for the other three nonveteran employees to bump into and created
only a temporary position for employee to work in until the spring road test
for floater was conducted. Nonetheless,
the job was specifically created as a temporary position. The Probation Department only needed an
additional driver to deliver wood for a few months during the late winter and
the Board clearly stated its intent to create only a temporary position. Petitioner makes some claim that the
position is still necessary and being performed, but there is no evidence to
that effect. Petitioner's position was
as a temporary truck driver that was to terminate upon the completion of the
road test for the floater position. The
provisions of Minn. Stat. § 197.46 do not apply to such positions. Crnkovich v. Independent School
District No. 701, 273 Minn. 518, 142 N.W.2d 284 (1966). Thus, Petitioner's removal from the
temporary truck driver position at the time it terminated did not violate the
provisions of Minn. Stat. § 197.46.
Petitioner's Application for
the Floater Position
Petitioner argues that
Respondent violated his veterans preference rights in the hiring for the
floater position in the spring of 1997.
He argues that the test for the position was divided into two parts, the
100-point experience and training rating and the 240-point equipment operation
test. Thus, he argues, the test was
actually a 340-point test on which he was accorded only five points veterans
preference. Petitioner argues that a
test that applies the veterans preference points only to the smaller portion of
the test does not comply with the requirements of Hall. The Administrative Law Judge agrees.
Respondent argues that it
properly applied the veterans preference credit for Petitioner because it
applied the five-point credit after converting the eligibility scores to a
100-point scale. It argues that veterans
preference points are to be applied for determining the list of
"eligibles" under Minn. Stat. § 43A.12, subd. 4, and that was what
was done in this case. That statute
requires "eligibles" to be ranked according to their ratings and
examinations and the veterans preference provisions of Minn. Stat. §
43A.11. Respondent also argues that, as
previously stated by this Administrative Law Judge in a report adopted by the
Commissioner of Veterans Affairs, the Veterans Preference Act does not
guarantee the right to be among the finalists interviewed for a position and
provides no preference at all toward being the person selected from among those
interviewed. Bruun v. Crow Wing
County, OAH Docket No. 69-3100-5788-2 (1991).
As administered by the
County, the road test is actually part of creating the eligibility list; it is
not a method used by the appointing authority for selecting among finalists
certified to it by the Human Resources Department. Exhibit 37 itself shows that Clayton, the Human Resources
Officer, labeled the combined score listing as the "Official Elig
List". Olson, the Human Resources
Director testified that normally the top 10 names on the list would be
certified to the appointing authority and the appointing authority could select
from any of those certified.
In this particular case,
Respondent's two-part 340-point test renders the five veterans preference
points almost meaningless. This, of
course, is caused by the relatively enormous weight given to the road test (240
points maximum) versus the experience and training rating (30 points maximum)
and the minimum requirements rating (70 points). The fact that the methodology used by the County seriously
dilutes the effect of the veterans preference points is made clear by the
results here. Based on the experience
and training rating, including the minimum requirements, bonus points and
veterans preference points, all 13 of the top 13 rated applicants were veterans
or disabled veterans. After application
of the road test score, only five of the top 12 ranked applicants were
veterans.
In Lehto v. St. Louis
County Civil Service Commission, OAH Docket No. 4-3100-2703-2, Report
of the Administrative Law Judge, November 30, 1988, adopted by Commissioner
January 20, 1989, it was held that a multi-part testing system that only
allowed the highest 20 applicants to proceed to the next test violated the
Veterans Preference Act. It was held
that veterans must be allowed to complete all parts of a civil service
examination if they obtain a passing score in each part so that veterans
preference points may be added to the final score. While the fact situation is different here, the underlying basis
of the decision applies. That is, the
intent of the Veterans Preference Act to afford an honorably discharged veteran
a preference in securing a public job cannot be circumvented by a scoring
methodology that is contrary to that intent.
Because it rendered veterans preference points almost meaningless, the
testing and scoring system used by the County for the filling of the equipment
operator floater position in the spring of 1997 violated Petitioner's veterans
preference rights to a five-point credit on the examination rating as required
by Minn. Stat. § 43A.11, subd. 3.
Remedy
Under Minn. Stat. § 197.481,
subd. 1, when veterans preference rights have been denied, the Commissioner may
grant the veteran such relief the Commissioner finds justified by the
statutes. Even though the Veterans
Preference Act does not guarantee that a veteran will be hired, where it is
shown that a political subdivision denies the rights provided by Minn. Stat. §§
197.455 and 43A.11, it is within the authority and the discretion of the
Administrative Law Judge to recommend and the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs
to order that the veteran be hired. Hall
v. City of Champlin, 463 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1990). The facts in this case require such a
result. The County has made minimal
efforts to comply with the requirements of veterans preference. It apparently does not recognize that
veterans cannot be removed without a hearing while they are still in a
probationary position. Veterans
preference rights were never a part of the discussion during Petitioner's
removal. It was only after he was laid
off from the transfer station attendant position that he was given notice of
his veterans preference rights, a notice that was partially defective. There was no discussion of veterans
preference when it was decided not to allow Petitioner to take a pass/fail test
for floater in deference to other applicants who were not even County
employees. The County apparently has no
procedure for ranking veterans ahead of nonveterans with the same rating on
eligibility lists contrary to the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 43A.11, subd.
7, (two people are listed in Exhibit 37 as receiving a road test score of
164.00; the nonveteran is listed first).
Most importantly, the system used by the County in this particular case
renders the veterans preference points almost meaningless.
Moreover, Petitioner has not
been treated fairly by the County. The
County created jobs for the other three employees at the landfill, but did not
create one for Petitioner, the only veteran among them. Petitioner demonstrated by his previous work
for the Road and Bridge Department that he was well qualified for the position
and a good worker. Had the road test
been reduced to a reasonable proportion of the overall eligibility score, and
then veterans preference points applied, it is quite likely that Petitioner
would have been among the top 12 eligibles certified to the appointing
authority. The appointing authority
would have had the authority to appoint Petitioner, because that is the
"normal" procedure used by the County, contrary to the highest score
first method referred to by the union local president. Petitioner should have been appointed on
January 1, 1997, and certainly on June 10, 1997, after the spring road
test. It is appropriate that that appointment
be required now. It is also appropriate
that he be awarded backpay, benefits and interest in accordance with Henry
v. Metropolitan Waste Control Commission, 401 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. 1987).
S.M.M.
[1] Petitioner was not notified of his veterans preference rights under Minn. Stat. § 197.46 to a hearing on his removal. Minn. Stat. § 197.46 applies even to removal from probationary positions.
State ex rel. Sprague v. Heise, 243 Minn. 367, 67 N.W.2d 907 (1954).