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3-2000-17810-2 |
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STATE OF
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
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In
the Matter of the Denial of Certification of the Variance Granted to Robert
W. Hubbard by the City of |
ORDER ON PETITIONS
FOR INTERVENTION |
This
matter is pending before Administrative Law Judge Kathleen D. Sheehy pursuant
to a Notice and Order for Prehearing Conference and Order for Hearing dated January
23, 2007. The St. Croix River
Association filed a Petition for Intervention on February 14, 2007; the Sierra
Club filed a Petition for Intervention on February 21, 2007. Both Petitions for Intervention were timely filed
under the First Prehearing Order. Robert
W. Hubbard and the City of
David P. Iverson, Assistant Attorney
General,
Scott R. Strand, Esq.,
A. W. Clapp,
Based
upon the record in this matter, and for the reasons set forth in the attached
Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. The Petitions for Intervention filed by the St. Croix River Association and the Sierra Club are hereby GRANTED. The Intervenors shall be permitted to participate as parties in this proceeding with all the rights and responsibilities associated with party status.
2. The Intervenors shall comply with the First Prehearing Order entered in this matter on February 15, 2007.
3. The Intervenors will be expected to work in a cooperative manner with the Department of Natural Resources to coordinate the presentation of evidence and avoid the introduction of duplicative evidence.
Dated: March 7, 2007
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s/Kathleen
D. Sheehy |
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KATHLEEN
D. SHEEHY |
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Administrative
Law Judge |
MEMORANDUM
Robert Hubbard is the owner of real
property in the City of
As alleged in the Notice and Order for
Hearing, the existing residence on the Hubbard property is an 800-square foot
home that is considered to be a substandard structure because it is located
less than 40 feet from the bluffline.[3] Hubbard has proposed to construct a new
single-family residence utilizing and incorporating as part of the new
structure the footprint of the existing non-conforming residential structure. While a majority of the proposed residence
will be located back from the existing structure, Hubbard proposes that the
existing structure be demolished and that a wing of the new residence be
located on the footprint of the old residence.
Hubbard applied to the City of
Petitions for Intervention
The Petitioners seek to intervene as parties in this
matter. The St. Croix River Association
has existed since 1911, and its mission is to preserve the uses and beauty of
the
The Sierra Club, through its Minnesota North Star
Chapter, has also petitioned to intervene.
The Sierra Club has approximately 22,000 members in
The DNR supports the petitions for
intervention of the St. Croix River Association and the Sierra Club.[7] The DNR maintains that the members of the St.
Croix River Association, as landowners on or near the St. Croix River, have a
unique historical perspective on the uses and management of the lower
Hubbard and the City of
Discussion
The Rules
of the Office of Administrative Hearings, Minn. R. 1400.6200, subp. 1, provide
in relevant part:
Any person not named in the notice of hearing who
desires to intervene in a contested case as a party shall submit a timely
written petition to intervene to the judge and shall serve the petition upon
all existing parties and the agency. . . .
The petition shall show how the petitioner’s legal rights, duties, or
privileges may be determined or affected by the contested case; shall show how
the petitioner may be directly affected by the outcome or that petitioner’s
participation is authorized by state, rule, or court decision; shall set forth
the grounds and purposes for which intervention is sought; and shall indicate
petitioner’s statutory right to intervene if one should exist.
In addition, the Administrative Law Judge “shall
allow intervention upon a proper showing pursuant to subpart 1 unless the judge
finds that the petitioner’s interest is adequately represented by one or more
parties participating in the case.”[10]
The
Petitioners contend, in letter briefs filed after their intervention petitions,
that Minn. Stat. § 116B.09, subd. 1, authorizes intervention in this matter.[11] That section, which is part of the Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act (MERA), specifies that “any partnership, corporation,
association, organization or other legal entity having shareholders, members,
partners, or employees residing within the state shall be permitted to intervene as
a party” in “any administrative . . . proceeding” upon “the filing of a
verified pleading asserting that the proceeding . . . involves conduct that has
caused or is likely to cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air,
water, land or other natural resources located within the state.”[12]
The
Respondents contend the Petitioners cannot rely on the intervention rights
provided by Minn. Stat. § 116B.09, subd. 1.
First, in reliance on Nizzardo v.
State Traffic Comm’n, 259
In Nizzardo, the plaintiff had attempted to
intervene and raise environmental issues in a proceeding in which a developer
was attempting to obtain a certificate of operation for a proposed shopping
center from a state traffic commission.
The court held first that denial of a petition for intervention is not a
final agency decision from which an appeal may be taken; second, it held that the
Connecticut statute (comparable to MERA) authorizes intervention into an administrative
proceeding only for the purpose of raising environmental issues that are within
the jurisdiction of the agency in question.
Because the plaintiff had failed to allege any facts explaining how the
traffic safety issues pending before the state traffic commission might impact
the environment, but instead merely parroted the words of the statute, the
court found the commission had properly denied the intervention petition.[13] Specifically, the court said:
We thus conclude that a petition for intervention
filed under [the statute] must contain specific factual allegations setting
forth the environmental issue that the intervenor intends to raise. The facts contained therein should be
sufficient to allow the agency to determine from the face of the petition
whether the intervention implicates an issue within the agency’s jurisdiction.[14]
Here,
the Petitions for Intervention are signed by the president of the St. Croix
River Association and counsel for the Sierra Club. The intervention petitions describe the
environmental concerns the Petitioners wish to raise by specific citation to
rule and statute, and the DNR clearly has jurisdiction to consider these
concerns. The Administrative Law Judge
concludes that Nizzardo provides no
authority to deny the intervention petitions.
The Petitioners have adequately alleged a factual basis for their
environmental concerns.
Second,
the Respondents allege the Petitioners for Intervention failed to make the
factual allegations required by State ex rel.
Wacouta Township v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27 (Minn. App.
1993). There, the township brought suit in district
court seeking to enjoin a landowner from logging timber in an area where bald
eagles were nesting. The Court of
Appeals described the requirements for alleging an independent cause of action
brought under Minn. Stat. § 116B.03, subd. 1; the case involved no issue of
intervention under § 116B.09, subd. 1.
The requirements for establishing a prima
facie cause of action under MERA might apply, for example, if the DNR had certified
approval of the variance and the Petitioners then sought to enjoin construction
of the residence through an action filed in district court. The requirement to plead a prima facie case to state a claim under
MERA does not apply, however, to petitions for intervention in this
administrative proceeding.
Because
the Petitioners are associations having members within the state, and because
their petitions adequately assert that granting of the variance at issue would
be conduct that is likely to cause impairment of natural resources within the
state, the Administrative Law Judge is required to grant their petitions for
intervention by the mandatory language of Minn. Stat. § 116B.09, subd. 1.
Moreover,
the Petition for Intervention meets the standards for intervention even absent
a statutory right to intervene. The
Petitioners have made an adequate demonstration that their members may be
directly affected by the outcome of this case.[15] Based on this showing, intervention must be
granted under Minn. R. 1400.6200, subp. 3, unless the existing parties
adequately represent the petitioners’ interests. The Respondents maintain that the DNR
adequately represents the interests of the Petitioners. This argument might have more force if the
DNR had made it; here, however, the DNR maintains the Petitioners should be
given party status because their interests are different from those of the
general public.
As a
general matter, the showing required to establish that existing parties do not
adequately represent the petitioner’s interests is minimal.[16] In Costley
v. Caromin House, Inc.,[17]
the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that it has followed a policy of encouraging
all legitimate interventions, and quoted with approval the following portion of
Wright and Miller’s treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure: “[I]f [the applicant’s] interest is similar
to, but not identical with that of one of the parties, a discriminating judgment
is required on the circumstances of the particular case, but he ordinarily
should be allowed to intervene unless it is clear that the party will provide
adequate representation for the absentee.”[18]
Although
the interests of the DNR may be similar in certain respects to those of the
Petitioners, since the DNR is expected to represent the public interest in
protecting the environment, the DNR’s interests are broader and not identical
to those of the Petitioners. The
Petitioners have shown that they have a particular interest in protecting the
environmental character of the
Unlike the
situation in State ex rel. Powderly v.
Erickson,[19]
the petitions in this matter were timely filed, there has been an adequate
showing that the interests of the Petitioners are not adequately represented by
the existing parties, and the Petitioners do, in fact, allege that they have
additional information that may be relevant to this proceeding. Their Petitions for Intervention are
accordingly granted.
The record is not clear at this point
whether the Sierra Club or the St. Croix River Association intend to present
evidence on issues other than the set-back requirement. If there is a
disagreement as to what the issues are for hearing, the parties should address
this in the prehearing briefs to be filed pursuant to the First Prehearing
Order.
K.D.S.
[1] See
[2]
[3]
[4] Notice and Order for Prehearing Conference and Order for Hearing ¶¶ 6-10.
[5] Petition for Intervention by the St. Croix River Association and attachment (filed Feb. 14, 2007); see also Response to Objections to Petition for Intervention (Feb. 24, 2007).
[6] Petition for Intervention by the Sierra Club (February 21, 2007).
[7] Letters from David P. Iverson to ALJ (Feb. 23, 2007, and March 2, 2007).
[8]
[9]
Hubbard’s Objection to Petition for Intervention (Feb. 16, 2007); City of
[10] Minn. R. 1400.6200, subp. 3.
[11] Letter from Andrew Shern and A.W. Clapp to ALJ (Mar. 7, 2007).
[12] Minn. Stat. § 116B.09, subd. 1 (emphasis added).
[13] 788 A.2d at 1176-78.
[14]
[15] See, e.g., In the Matter of the Revocation of the Private Fish Hatchery License for Spring Valley Ponds, LLC, and the Public Waters Restoration and Replacement Order No. W830836, Ruling on Petition for Intervention, OAH Docket No. 11-2000-17249-2 (July 5, 2006) (Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy, Trout Unlimited, and the Minnesota Trout Association permitted to intervene in a proceeding to revoke the private fish hatchery license of Spring Valley Ponds); In the Matter of the Application of the City of Brooklyn Park to Extend 73rd Avenue North Across a Wetland between Boone Avenue and Highway 169, OAH Docket No. 6-2000-1385-2 (1987) (Northland Development Company’s petition to intervene in a case in which the city sought to gain DNR approval to extend a road across a wetland was granted because Minn. Stat. § 116B.09, subd. 1, “required its approval” and because the petition met the standards contained in Minn. R. 1400.6200, subp. 1).
[16]
G. Beck, M. B. Gossman, L.
[17]
313 N.W.2d 21 (
[18] 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1909, at 524 (1972).
[19]
285 N.W.2d 84 (