OAH 46-1800-20321-2
STATE OF
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS
FOR DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
|
In
the Revocation of the License of Wendy J. Melby to Provide Family Child Care |
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION |
The above-entitled
matter came on for hearing before Administrative Law Judge Barbara J. Runchey on
Damian
D. Sandy, Assistant Pipestone County Attorney, appeared on behalf of the
Department of Human Services. Tracy R.
Eichhorn-Hicks appeared on behalf of Wendy J. Melby.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Whether the Order of
Revocation revoking the family child care license of Wendy J. Melby should be
affirmed?
Based upon the proceedings herein, the Administrative Law
Judge makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
The witnesses who testified at the hearing were Danette
Smit, Pipestone
2.
Licensee has been licensed as a family child care provider since
approximately June 2003.[1] Prior to 2007, there was no record of any
reports, correction violations or licensing infractions.[2]
3.
On or about
On
On
4.
At this hearing, Licensee explained how these two instances
occurred which was consistent which the description set forth in the Correction
Order except she was always within 2 or 3 feet of the sight or hearing of the
children when the instances occurred and that she was at all times capable of
intervening.[4]
5.
Licensee did not timely seek reconsideration of the
6.
On
7.
During the
8.
Licensee testified that she could not always be with the
children who used the Taxi or the Head Start Bus as she had to care and feed
the other 12 children in her care, although she went up and down the stairs
periodically to check on the children waiting for the bus. In addition, she believed that the Taxi driver
waited and watched and/or walked the children to her door.[9]
9.
Smit asserts that Licensee gave deliberately misleading
information regarding this incident, particularly as it related to an
assumption made by her about “Avery” getting
on the Taxi without supervision. “Avery”
is the name of Licensee’s son and is also the name of another child in Licensee’s
care.[10] Licensee stated that she did not see the
children get off the bus.[11]
10.
Ultimately, Smit
learned that the “Avery” was another preschool child in Licensee’s care with
the same name as Licensee’s son. On
11.
On or about
On
12.
Licensee did not appeal this Correction Order.[14]
13.
On December 3, 2007, Smit reviewed child care assistance billing
vouchers in an attempt to determine if any children were receiving daycare
assistance that were not listed as children in Licensee’s daycare. It was determined by Smit that H.B. and Z.W. may
have been attending Licensee’s daycare and were not listed on Licensee’s
variance request in October, 2007.[15]
14.
On December 5, 2007, Smit submitted a report that she
“received a print out of Licensee’s child care assistance families” and that two
(names and date of births unknown) children were not listed on her variance and
they were enrolled at the time she was granted a variance.[16]
15.
On
16.
On December 21, 2007, when confronted about child care assistance
records, Licensee indicated that they were not reliable because when a child “does
not show up for daycare she does not mark them as absent.” The only children marked as absent were the
ones that call ahead of time. On this
date, Licensee indicated that Z.W. was gone “all last week and was a no show
all of this week” and had no idea if he was coming back. Licensee’s helper, J.D., also verified that Z.W.
had not been to daycare for two to three weeks, that Z.W. is a no-show and does
not call.[19]
17.
On
18.
On
19.
On December 17, 2007, B.S., the parent of T.C., reported to Smit
that her preschooler, A.F., was also enrolled in Licensee’s daycare on a full
time basis but some weeks, Licensee could not take her because she was full. It was during this contact that B.S also
revealed that her son, T.C. was also enrolled full-time and that she was told
by Licensee that she could start full-time on
20.
On
21.
On
22.
On
23.
On March 11, 2008, an unannounced visit was made to
Licensee’s home. There were no children
in the shed which was dark and there was nothing to note in the shed which
would have indicated the presence of children. Licensee was asked about D.D. and K.D. as
child care assistance vouchers showed these children were enrolled in her
daycare since October 2007, despite the fact Licensee had represented earlier
to Smit that these children were just drop-ins and Licensee would call their
parents when she had room for them. According
to Smit, Licensee did not respond to this inquiry.[28]
24.
On
25.
On March 17, 2008, J.D. initially indicated that Licensee had
never hidden children when there was an unannounced home visit. She further indicated on this date that she
and Licensee never cared for three infants and were not over in toddlers;
represented that G.D. (a preschooler) came Monday through Thursdays and M.D. (a
toddler) only came if there was room otherwise she was with her grandmother.[30]
26.
Also, on March 17, 2008, J.D’s mother-in-law (the children’s
grandmother), reported to Smit that she only watches M.D. and G.D. on Fridays
and that they typically attend daycare at Licensee’s Monday through Thursday.[31]
27.
Later on
28.
Smit cross-checked the listing of child care children
enrolled in Licensee’s daycare with child care assistance records and/or food
program records, and concluded based upon this information and telephone
interviews with several parents that there were occasions that Licensee had
over 14 children (attachment J to Exhibit 1). Smit testified that she did not verify whether
or not a certain child was actually present on a certain day (for example by
calling a parent), nor did Smit verify what the policy of the child care
assistance or food program was as it related to reimbursement for a child who
was not actually present on a given day.
Smit acknowledged that a child could have been absent on a given day
even though the child care assistance record or food program record indicated otherwise.[33]
29.
Licensee represented that if a parent calls in she marks
that child as absent and if the child is a no show the child is marked as
present. As a consequence, a child does
not have to actually be in her care for her to submit reimbursement for child
care assistance.[34]
30.
On
31.
On September 25, 2008, M.F, who was another helper of Licensee,
made a report to Smit regarding Licensee’s overcapacity during the summer months
of June, July and August 2008, and specifically on
32.
M.F. reported that Licensee had taken her son to
33.
On
34.
Smit did not discuss M.F.’s allegations with Licensee or
give her the opportunity to refute these allegations as she believed M.F. was a
reliable witness.[41]
35.
On
36.
The Appellant properly appealed the Order of Revocation.
37.
The Department provided Notice of an Order for Hearing and a
contested hearing was held.
38.
These Findings are based on all of the evidence in the
record. Citations to portions of the
record are not intended to be exclusive references.
39.
To the extent that the Memorandum that follows explains the
reasons for these Findings of Fact and contains additional findings of fact,
including findings on credibility, the Administrative Law Judge incorporates
them into these Findings.
40.
The Administrative Law Judge adopts as Findings any
conclusions that are more appropriately described as Findings.
Based upon these Findings of Fact, the Administrative Law
Judge makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
The Commissioner of Human Services and the Administrative
Law Judge have jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 14.50,
245A.07 and 245A.08.
2.
The Department gave proper and timely notice of the hearing
in this matter.
3.
The Department has complied with all relevant substantive
and procedural requirements of law and rule.
4.
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 245A.06 if the commissioner finds
that the applicant or licensee holder has not corrected the violations
specified in the correction order or conditional license, the commissioner may
impose a fine or order other licensing sanctions pursuant to section 245A. 07.
5.
Minn. R. 9502.0315, subp. 29a, defines “supervision” as:
‘Supervision’ means a
caregiver being within sight or hearing of an infant, toddler, or preschooler
at all times so that the caregiver is capable of intervening to protect the
health and safety of the child. For the
school age child, it means a caregiver being available for assistant and care
so that the child’s health and safety is protected.
6.
Licensee failed to meet the requirement that a caregiver
supervised the children in her daycare within the meaning of Minn. R. 9502.0315,
subp. 29a.
7.
Minn. R. 9502.0315 to 9502.0445 establishes procedures and
standards for licensing family day care to ensure that minimum standards of
care and service are given and the protection, proper care, health, safety, and
development of the children are assured.
8.
Pursuant to Minn. R. 9502.0035, when a provider is granted a
variance from compliance with parts 9502.315 to 9502.0445, the applicant must
comply with all applicable laws, ordinances and regulations.
9.
Licensee failed to comply with all applicable laws,
ordinances and regulations.
10.
Minn. R. 9502.0365, subp. 1, sets forth capacity limits as
follows:
Capacity limits. Family day care and group
family day care providers shall comply with part 9502.0367, which limits the
total number of children and the number of preschoolers, toddlers, and infants
who may be in care at any one time, and provides for the number of adults who
are required to be present.
A. Providers shall be licensed for the total
number of children, ten years of age or younger, who are present in the
residence at any one time. The licensed
capacity must include all children of any caregiver when the children are
present in the residence.
B. Within the licensed capacity, the age
distribution restrictions specify the maximum number of children under school
age, infants, and toddlers who are in care at any one time.
11.
Licensee exceeded capacity limits under her licensure
pursuant to
12.
Minn. R. 9502.0365, subp. 5 provides:
Subp. 5. Supervision and use of substitutes. A licensed provider must be the primary
provider of care in the residence.
Children in care must be supervised by a caregiver. The use of a substitute caregiver must be
limited to a cumulative total of not more than 30 days in any 12-month period.
13.
Licensee failed be the primary provider of care in the
residence several times during June, July and August, 2008 and on
14.
|
Child/Adult Ratio |
Age Restrictions |
||
|
Licensed Capacity |
Adults |
Total children under
school age |
Total infants and
toddlers |
|
14 |
2 A helper may be used in
place of a second adult caregiver when there is no more than 1 infant or
toddler present. |
10 |
Of the total children
under school age, a combined total of no more than 4 shall be infants and
toddlers. Of this total, no more than
3 shall be infants. |
15. Licensee exceeded child/adult and age distribution
restrictions.
16. When a licensee does not comply with the rules governing
daycare licensure, Minn. Stat. § 245A.07 authorizes sanctions as follows:
Subdivision 1. Sanctions;
appeals; license. (a) In addition to
making a license conditional under section 245A.06, the commissioner may
propose to suspend or revoke the license, impose a fine, or secure an
injunction against the continuing operation of the program of a license holder
who does not comply with applicable law or rule. When applying sanctions
authorized under this section, the commissioner shall consider the nature,
chronicity, or severity of the violation of law or rule and the effect of the
violation on the health, safety, or rights of persons served by the program.
17. The burden of proof requires that the Department demonstrate
reasonable cause for taking a negative licensing action by submitting evidence
to substantiate the allegations that the license holder failed to comply fully
with applicable laws or rules.
18. The Commissioner has demonstrated reasonable cause for
revoking the license on the basis that the Licensee has failed to fully comply
with applicable rule and law.
19. Because the Department has demonstrated reasonable cause, the
burden of proof shifts to the Licensee to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that she was in full compliance with the laws and rules which the Department
alleges the Licensee violated.
20. The Licensee has failed to sustain her burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence that she fully complied with applicable laws and rules with
respect to her license.
Based
upon these conclusions and for the reasons explained in the accompanying
Memorandum, the Administrative Law Judge makes the following:
RECOMMENDATION
IT
IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:
Based
upon these conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge RECOMMENDS to the Commissioner
of Human Services that the family child care license of Wendy J. Melby be REVOKED.
Dated: July 30,
2009
s/Barbara
J. Runchey
|
BARBARA
J. RUNCHEY Administrative
Law Judge |
Reported: Digitally recorded
NOTICES
This
report is a recommendation, not a final decision. The Commissioner of Human Services
(Commissioner) will make the final decision after a review of the record and may
adopt, reject or modify these Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and
Recommendation. Under Minn. Stat. §§
14.61 and 245A.07, subd. 2a(b), the parties adversely affected have ten (10)
calendar days to submit exceptions to this Report and request to present argument
to the Commissioner. The record shall
close at the end of the ten-day period for submission of exceptions. The Commissioner then has ten (10) working
days from the close of the record to issue his final decision. Parties should contact Cal Ludeman,
Commissioner of Human Services,
Under
Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 1, the agency is required to serve its final
decision upon each party and the Administrative Law Judge by first class mail
or as otherwise provided by law.
MEMORANDUM
While the events regarding
overcapacity are tangled, it was clear from the evidence submitted that
Licensee was overcapacity on occasions noted in the Findings. Based upon the evidence submitted Licensee was
also out of age distribution requirements on occasions noted in the Findings. Even after Licensee should have been on notice
about overcapacity issues (after discussions with Smit), child care assistance
records and reports from two separate helpers substantiated overcapacity.
While less restrictive
alternatives, such as regular inspections and/or ordering Licensee to take
education classes could be envisioned they are not workable in this case. Based upon the evidence presented, particularly
the deliberate withholding of information or giving false or misleading
information by Licensee during the investigative process makes these
alternatives untenable.
Licensee clearly failed to
have two children within sight or hearing so that she was capable on
intervening on June 12, 2007. Lifeguards
intervened to assist two separate children before Licensee was able come to
their assistance. She was not capable of
intervening to protect the health and safety of the child on these occasions. In addition, Licensee was not within sight or
hearing when a child got off a Taxi/HeadStart bus on November 29, 2007. These violations, coupled with the
overcapacity Findings, all which occurred within 24 months of each other are
troubling as the paramount concern in these types of cases is to ensure the
safety and protection of young children.
While the animosity between
Smit and Licensee was palpable, the reports and testimony of Smit were
credible. There was no evidence
submitted to suggest that Smit had any ulterior motive for distorting the truth
or for being deceitful. While the issues
of overcapacity and age distribution were difficult to track, in large part due
to the number of children involved and the lack of documentary evidence
supporting the testimony of Smit, her testimony and reports were convincing. In addition, while at least two individuals
apparently recanted previous statements they made to Smit, there was
sufficient, reliable evidence that multiple episodes of overcapacity occurred
in Licensee’s daycare. Specifically, the
two separate reports by helpers J.D. and M.F. substantiated the conclusions of
overcapacity. The failure by either
party to call these individuals was troubling as it required evaluation of the
evidence based upon the submission of written reports rather than oral
testimony. Nonetheless, the weight of
the evidence presented substantiated the allegations that Licensee failed to
comply with applicable laws or rules. Therefore,
the Department met its burden of proof and demonstrated reasonable cause for
the revocation action.
Licensee’s credibility was
dubious. At least twice in December
2007, Licensee was observed with children in her care that were not listed on
her variance request. In December 2007,
Licensee represented that children in her care were “drop-ins” when evidence
showed that child care assistance was paid for these children on a regular
basis since October 2007, and a helper indicated she was overcapacity. On December 29, 2008, Licensee reported
that T.C was not in her care when he actually was. On December 21, 2007, Licensee reported that
G.D. and M.D. were not regular children in her daycare where a helper and other
reporters indicated they were. On
September 16, 2008, a helper reported that Licensee was overcapacity, out of
age distribution and that she was frequently left alone with 14 to 15 children.
This evidence demonstrates a pattern of
dishonesty in withholding information or giving misleading information during
the investigation process.
In determining what
sanctions should apply, the nature, chronicity or severity of the violation of
law or rule and the effect of the violation upon the health, safety or rights
of persons served by the program must be analyzed. Asserting there is no imminent danger to the
children because nothing harmful occurred is not the measure which guides this
case. The issue is whether Licensee
complied with applicable rules and laws. Viewing the evidence as a whole the Department
met its burden of proof and demonstrated chronic violations over a short period
of time. The capacity rules are in place
to ensure that daycare providers are able to maintain adequate supervision over
children, are able to intervene to prevent injury and to respond to individual
needs of the children as they arise. The
overcapacity and age distribution violations, when considered as a whole, along
with Licensee’s violations of supervision rules coupled with Licensee’s proclivity
to minimize or distort facts, provides the Department with reasonable cause for
revocation.
Because the Department met
its burden of proof in demonstrating that
reasonable cause existed for taking the revocation action, the burden
then shifts to the Licensee to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that she was in full compliance with the law or rules that the Department
claims was violated. The explanations
given by Licensee at the hearing were evasive, dubious and/or not as credible
as other reports filed by Smit. For
example, child care assistance records and/or reports by Licensee’s helpers
indicated that children were in her daycare on days when Licensee indicated
they were not present. Licensee’s
explanations that she could mark a child as “present” for child care assistance
payments, even if the child was not present, is troubling. In particular, Licensee’s testimony that only
one of her helpers’ children attended her daycare was directly contradicted by
at least one contrary report by her helper, and by another report by her helper’s
mother-in-law that both children were at Licensee’s daycare when Licensee
asserted they were not present. In
short, Licensee failed to sustain her burden of proof.
B. J. R.
[1] Testimony of Wendy J. Melby
[2]
[3] Test. of Danette Smit; Ex. 1
[4] Test. of W. Melby
[5] Test. of W.
Melby and D. Smit
[6] Ex. 1
[7] Test. of D. Smit; Ex. 1
[8] Test. of W. Melby
[9] Test. of W. Melby; Ex. 1
[10] Test. D. Smit; Ex. 1
[11] Test. of W. Melby; Ex. 1
[12] Test. of D. Smit; Ex. 1
[13] Test of D. Smit;
Ex. 1
[14] Test. of D. Smit and W. Melby
[15] Test. of D. Smit; Ex. 1
[16] Ex. 1
[17] Test. of W. Melby; Ex. 1
[18]
[19]
[20] Test. of D. Smit; Ex. 1
[21] Test. of W. Melby; Ex. 1
[22] Ex. 1
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] Test. of D. Smit; Ex. 1
[34] Test. of W. Melby; Ex. 1
[35] Ex. 3
[36] Ex. 3
[37]
[38] Test. of
[39] Ex. 3
[40] Test. of W. Melby
[41] Test. of D. Smit
[42] Ex. 3