HS 88 026 PE
4 1800 1865 2
STATE OF MINNESOTA
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FOR THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
The Department of Human
Services of the State
of Minnesota, FINDINGS Of FACT,
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
Complainant,
Vs
Muriel Humphrey
Residences,
Respondent.
!he above entitled matter came on for hearing before Administrative law
Judge Peter C. Erickson at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, November 25, 1981, at the
Office of Administrative Hearings, Minneapolis, Minnesota. the record on this
matter closed on January 12, 1988, the date of receipt of the last post hearing
memorandum.
Wayne G. Faris and John M. Stoxen, from the firm of Oppenheimer, Wolff &
Donnelly, Attorneys at law, 1700 First Bank Building, St. Paul, Minnesota
55101, appeared on behalf of the Minnesota Department of Human Services.
Ronald L. Haskvitz and Joel W. Lavintman, from the firm of Smith, Juster,
Feikema, Malmon & Haskvitz, Attorneys at law, 1000 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth
Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402, appeared on behalf of the Respondent,
Muriel Humphrey Residendes (MHR).
Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to Minn. Stat. 14.61 the final
decision of the Commissioner of Human Services shall not be made until this
Report has been made available to the parties to the proceeding for at least
ten days, and an opportunity has been afforded to each party adversely
a f fected to file except ions and present argument to the Commi ssi oner.
Exceptions to this Report, if any, s ha I 1 be fi led with Commissi oner Sandra
Gardebring, Second Floor, Space Center Building, 444 lafayette Road, St. Paul,
Minnesota 55101.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
!he issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether the Department of
Human Service% should be estopped from recovering reimbursement paid Lo MHR
for reserved bed days.
Based upon a II of I he pr oreedings here in, the Administ rative law Judge
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Prior to the commencement of this hearing, the parties entered into a
Stipulation of Facts and Exhibits which constitute the basis for this
litigation, The stipulated facts are set forth below in paragraphs a. through
o. Exhibits referenced in the Stipulation are contained in the record but
will not be duplicated as part of these Findings.
a. The Muriel Humphrey Residences (MHR) are operated
by louise Whitbeck Fraser Community Services, Inc., a
Minnesota nonprofit corporation. The MHR have been
licensed continuously since November 1976, by the Minnesota
Department of Human Services (DHS) and its predecessor, the
Department of Public Welfare, to provide residential care
for mentally retarded men and women over the age of sixteen
years .
b. The MHR consist of three detached buildings
located in Eden Prairie, Minnesota. The names and addresses
of the three bui Idings are as follows : Charlson House,
8151 Preserve Boulevard; Fraser House, 8761 Preserve
Boulevard; Westby House, 8171 Preserve Boulevard.
C. The MHR are facilities of a type commonly referred
to an Intermediate Care Facility/Mental Retardation
(ICF/MR). The MHR were originally licensed in 1916 to
receive medical assistance (MA) reimbursement for (are
provided to MA recipients during the following twelve
months. (Exhibit 1.) !he licensing has been extended
continuously. Copies of the DHS records that detail how
the three MHR buildings have been licensed are attached as
follows: Charlson House, Exhibit 2 (2 pages); Eraser
House, Exhibit 3 (2 pages); Wentby House, Exhibit 4
(2 pages).
d. Prior to February 1980, the three MHR buildings
were licenned an one, 36 bed ICF/MR. Beginning February 1,
1980, and extending throughout the period in question in
this case (July 1983 through February 1986), the MHR were
licensed as three, 12 bed ICF/MR's. Copies of the DHS
licenses issued February 1, 1980, to each of MHR buildings
are attached as follows: Charlson House, Exhibit 5; Fraser
Houne, Exhibit 6; Wentby House, Exhibit 7. Copies of the
ICF/MR provider agreements and Department of Health
Certification notices in force during the period in
question are attached an follows: Charlson House,
Exhibit 8 (6 pages); Eraser House, Exhibit 9 (6 pages);
Westby House, Exhibit 10 (6 pages).
e. Before the change in licensing of the MHR wan
requested in 1980, representatives of the MHR met with
Virginia Presley of DHS who recommended the MHR separately
license its three facilities.
f. This contented case was initiated by issuance of a
Notice of Agency Action by DHS, dated May 1, 1986. A copy
- 2 -
of the notice and a schedu I e attac bed to the notic e t hd t
detai ls the claim is at tac bed as Exhi bit II ( 3 pages ) .
g. The amount alleged to be in dispute in the Notice
of Agency Action was $32,837.17. This amount wan Calculated
by OHS investigator Thomas L. Neumann after he conducted an
audit of payments received by the MHR between July 1983 and
February 1986, the period in question. Mr. Neumann's audit
showed that the MHR had billed and received payment for
616 days for which OHS alleges the MHR was not entitled to
receive payment.
h. The MHR do not contest the validity of the audit,
except to the extent that the audit purports to recapture
$219.84 for private-pay patient Charles Stevens. The OHS
accepts the MHR contention and has agreed to decrease the
amount sought to be recovered by $219.84. Thus, it is
agreed by both parties that the amount in controversy is
$32,617.33
i. An the Notice of Agency Action (Fxhibit 11)
details, the calculation of the amount sought to be
recovered by OHS is based on the fact that federal law
permits medical ansistance payments for reserved bed days
only if "[T]he State plan provides for such payments and
specifies any limitations on the policy." 42 C.F.R.
447.40.
j . The Minnesota State Plan for reimbursing services
provided to MA recipients allows an ICF/MR to be reimbursed
f or residentia I are even when the resident in absent from
the facility if the resident is absent for a home vi si I ,
camping, or a hospitdl stay. The State Plan, however,
limits reimbursement by requiring that ICF/MR's meet
minimum facility occupancy rates in order to he e I i g ib I e
for reimbursement. This reserved bed day pol icy is set for
[sicl in a OHS long Term Care Bulletin dated April 1978, a
copy of which is attached an Exhibit I S. The reserved bed
day policy is also reprinted in a Long Term Care Bulletin
dated September 1983, a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit 13.
k . OHS mails copies of all Long Term Care Bulletins
to all ICF/Mk providers by fi rst-class mail at the time
such long Term Care Bulletins are issued. The MHR received
copien of exhibils I? and 13.
1. in the long Term Care Bulletins altached as
Fxhibits 12 and 13, the OHS sets forth the following
reserved bed days policy:
Occupancy Rate - the occupancy rate for purpones
of this policy may be calculated separately for
each certified level of care in the facility as
follows:
3 -
(1) Determine the number of day, each certi
fied bed was occupied during the month.
A reserved bed may be considered as an
occupied bed for this purpose.
(2) Total to determine the number of occupied
bed days for the month.
(3) Divide by the number of days in the
current month.
(4) Divide by the number of certified beds to
determine the occupancy rate for the
month.
If the monthly average for the full month occupancy
was 93% or higher (not rounded), the facility may
claim reserved bed days for that month if the other
criteria is met.
NOTE: facilities with 24 or less certified beds
may claim reserved bed days provided that they have
not had d certified bed vacant for the entire
month. A reserved bed may be considered as an
occupied bed for this purpose.
All days for which payment has been made for a
reserved bed shall he counted as actual patient
days for DPW Rule 49 and DPW Rule 52, rate
determinations.
Exhibit 12 at Page 3; see also Exhibit 13 at Page 7.
M. During the period in question, residents were
absent from the MHR buildings on the daten and for the
number of days set forth in Exhibit 14, pages I through 1.
n. The MHR billed the MA program and received payment
of $32,617.33 for days on which residents were absent from
the three MHR buildings. At no time during the period
relevant to this action Was the monthly average for the
full month occupancy below 93 percent. At no time during
the period relevant to this action were there residents
absent from the MHR houses for one month at the name time.
0. The only issues with respect lo reserved hod days
are whether the State of Minnesota should he equitably
estopped from applying the reserved bed day limitations net
forth in Exhibits 12 and 13, and how State rules should he
applied and interpreted.
2. The primary reason given by Ms, Presley (DHS employee) to MHR for
changing licensure status from one license to three licenses wan that in the
event of a fire or other similar catastrophe in one of the buildings, or the
outbreak of a communicdb I e disease, the entire fac i Iity wou Id have Io be shut
4
down if all operated under a single license. Under Separate licensure, the
unaffected facilities would be able to continue in operation. In addition,
MHR also found that it would be able to operate under less stringent standards
in several areas due to the sepa rate lic ensure of three, I? bed f ac i I it i es, as
opposed to one, 36 bed facility. These standards were in the areas of nursing
staff requirements (see, 42 C.F.R. 442.478 (1985)); dietary service require
ments (see 42 C.F.R. 442.413 (1985)); and emergency lighting requirements
(see, 42 C.F.R. 442.453 (1985)). !here is nothing in the record to indicate
that MHR received any cost benefits or greater reimbursement from the
Department of Human Services due to these less stringent standards.
3. In considering whether to make the licensure change, MHR was
concerned about whether its funding would be affected. Consequently, MHR,
through its Director of Residential Services, Steven Naill, and its Executive
Director, Dr. Robert Kowalczyk, contacted Thomas Neumann, an auditor at the
Department of Human Services, whom they had consulted in the past for answers
to questions related to funding and funding requirements. After the proposed
change in licensure was explained to Mr. Neumann, he advised MHR that it would
have no effect on its level of funding. Neumann further stated that MHR could
continue lo file only one cost report rather than a separate cost report for
each licensed facility. At the time this advice was given, Mr. Neumann was
not aware of the 24-bed or less exception to the 93 percent occupancy rule.
He did not become aware of this provision until 1984.
4. After speaking with Mr. Neumann, MHR made the decision to change its
licensure status from one, 36 bed facility to three, 12 bed facilities. From
February, 1980 through the present, each of the facilities which comprise the
Muriel Humphrey Residences has been licensed as a separate, 12-bed ICF/MR.
MHR has continued to submit one cost report, rather than three, for the three
licensed facilities and has been operated in all meaningful respects as one
facility providing intermediate care.
5. Consistent with Mr. Neumann's advice, the per diem rate reimbursement
remained the same for MHR after the licensure change. MHR thought that
Neumann's statements also applied to the application of the reserved bed day
rule, however.
6 . MHR wan aware of the less than 25 bed exception to the 93 percent
occupancy rule at the time the decision was made to change its licensure
status.
7. After the licensure change, MHR continued its policy of leaving one
bed open per facility for respite care as a service to the county. These
respite beds were nol always occupied, however. In 1986, Steven Naill called
Thomas Neumann to inquire whether or not respite care beds were taken into
consideration when determining compliance with the 93 percent occupancy
requirement. At that time, Mr. Neumann had changed job responsibilities and
become part of the Surveillance and Utilidtion Review Section of the
Department of Human Services. Neumann told Mr. Naill that he would visit MHR
in order to make d determination concerning the respite care beds.
B. During his visit to MHR, Mr. Neumann conducted a complete audit of
the census records and books. As a result of this audit, Mr. Neumann
concluded that for the period from July of 1983 through February of 1986, MHR
billed and received payment for 616 reserved bed days it was not entitled to
receive.
5 -
9. On May 1, 1986, the Department of Human Services sent a Notice of
Agency Action to the Muriel Humphrey Residences alleging that MHR had billed
and received payment for 616 days f or which it was not en t itled to receive
payment. this over payment was calculated to be $32,837.17. this amount was
subsequently reduced by $219.84, resulting an alleged over reimbursement of
$32,611.33,
10. If it in determined that MHR must reimburse the Department of Human
Services the amount alleged to be owing, that reimburnement would have to be
taken out of the current and future operating funds of MHR. this payback
would affect the quality of care MHR would be able to provide.
11. Because of this action taken by the Department, MHR does not currently
offer respite bed accommodations.
12. During the relevant time period herein, MHR operated at a 93 percent
or greater occupancy when that calculation in baned on a total capacity of
36 beds. There was never a time when all three respite beds were vacant for
an entire month at the name time.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Administrative low Judge
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Admininsrative law Judge and the Commissioner of Human Services
have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Minn, Stat. sec. 14.50 did
256B.064, subd. 2 (1986).
2 . I he Notice of Hearing was p roper as to form and ton I en t. th e
Department has complied w ith a I 1 other subs tan t ive and proc edura I requ i rements
of law or rule.
3. For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum below, the Department of
Human Services is estopped from claiming reimbursement as alleged herein.
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions, the Administrative law judge makes
the following:
RECOMMENDATION
If IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner of Human Services issue an
Order dismissing thin matter with prejudice.
Dated this day of February, 1988.
PETER C. ERICKSON
Administrative law Judge
NOTICE
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. 14.62, subd. 1, the agency in required to serve
its f ind I dec i s !on upon each party and the Administ rat ive law Judge by f i rst
c 1 ass ma i 1 .
Reported: taped, No Transcript Prepared.
MEMORANDUM
MHR, for the first time in its responsive brief, challenges the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Department, alleging that neither Minn, Stat.
256B.064, subd, la. or Minn. Rules 9500.1080, subp. 3, 9505.1910 or
9505.1920 apply herein. The Department has objected to Respondent raising
these issues for the first time in its responsive brief. the Judge is not
going to engage in a lengthy discussion of the jurisdictional issue for
several reasons. First, the Respondent stipulated that the only issue to be
tried in this proceeding was the "estoppel" issue. The Judge is aware that it
is horn book law that a party never waives a subject matter jurisdiction
defense. However, that issue has not been fully litigated in this case
because the Department was not put on notice that it would be an issue raised
by the Respondent.
Second, this Judge has already determined in a case with very similar
facts that jurisdiction exists pursuant to Minn. Stat. 256B,064, 4ubd4. la.
and 2 (1986). See, Minnesota Department of Human Services v. Fulton Residence
and--Innovative Homes, Inc. HS 86 -004 PE (Report issued July 20, 1987) The
Commissioner of Human Services issued a final decision affirming this
determination on October 2, 1981. Specifically, the Judge reads the language
contained in Minn. Stat. 256B.064, subd. la. broadly enough to encompass the
factual situation presented herein.
!he central issue tried in this case is whether the Department is estopped
from claiming reimbursement for reserved bed days as alleged herein. MHR
contends that the representations made by Thomas Neumann and its reliance on
those representations, in conjunction with the detriment it would suffer if
the Department were to recover, constitutes a suf ficient basis for equitable
estoppel. !he Department argues that it was not "reasonable" for MHR to rely
on anything Mr. Neumann said to them because Neumann's job responsibilities
did not include the interpretation or enforcement of reserved bed day require
ments. Consequently, he was not in a position to bind the Department on that
issue when he merely stated that MHR's funding would not be changed as a
result of the relicensure.
In order to establish estoppel against the government, a party must show
that representations or inducements were made, upon which that party reasonably
relied, and that the party will be harmed if the claim Of estoppel is not
allowed. Northern Petrochemical Company v. United States Fire Insurance
Company, 277 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1979). The government may be estopped if
justice requires, but that principle will not be "freely applied
Mesaba Aviation v, County of Itasca, 258 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1977). lo
estop a government agency, some element of fault or wrongful conduc t must be
shown. Ridgewood Development Company v. State, 294 N.W.2d 288, 292 93 (Minn.
1980). A party seeking to estop a governmental agency carries a heavy burden
of proof. Brown v. Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, 368 N.W.2d 906,
910 (Minn. 1985). However, a court will always weigh the public interest
frustrated by the estoppel against the equities in the cane. Id., Residential-
Alternatives v. Department of Human Services, 387 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Minn. App.
Depending on the facts of a specific case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
has used a balancing test to determine whether the principle of equitable
7
estoppel should apply. Beaty v. Minnesota Board of Teaching, 354 N.W.2d 466,
471 (Minn. App, 1984); Petition of Halberg Construction and Supply, Inc., 385
N.W.2d 381, 384 (Minn. App. 1986).l In those cases, the Court of Appeals
did not find specific "wrongful conduct" on behalf of the State agencies
involved. Rather, the Court employed a balancing test, weighing the public
interest against the equities shown by the petitioner. the Judge has
concluded that the "balancing" approach should be used herein to achieve a
just result. See also, Brown at 913.
The facts in this case show clearly that if MHR had continued its
operation as a single, 36 bed facility, it would be entitled to the
reimbursement it received for the reserved bed days at issue. It is only
MHR's decision to change its licensure status which resulted in the
disallowance of the reserved bed days reimbursement. MHR's community based
decision to maintain an "open" respite bed in each of the 12 bed facilities
caused it to not meet the requirements of the less than 25 bed exception to
the occupancy rule, At all relevant times herein, MHR fully met the reserved
bed occupancy limit for facilities having over 25 beds. There is no evidence
in the record to suggest that MHR's change in licensure status resulted in any
greater cost savings and/or reimbursement.
Although Mr. Neumann was not the "right" person to seek advice from
concerning all of the implications of relicensure, MHR relied upon his
statement that funding would not be affected due to the licennure change. Mr.
Neumann was a DHS auditor whose responsibilities included calculating and
authorizing per diem rates. If MHR is forced to repay the $32,000 at issue,
those monies will have to come out of future operating funds and result in a
lesser quality of care for residents. A final important factor is that DHS
took no act ion to remedy the mi stake from 1 980 Io 1 986 even though it knew
that MHR's licensure had been (hanged. The Judge is convinced that the
equities in favor of MHR far outweigh the public interest that May he
frustrated by estopping the Department of Human Services in this situation.
Consequently, the Judge has recommended that this matter be dismissed.
p.c.E .
In Beaty, an applicant for a license as a school psychologist relied on
advice from the executive secretary of the Board of leaching to complete
course work leading to licensure. After completion of the educational require
ment, Appellant's application was denied because of deficiencies in the program
of courses. The Court applied a balancing test, holding that, "Applying
estoppel against the government in this case will not frustrate any legitimate
public purpose, while failing to apply it will result in great hardship to
appellant." Beaty at 411. In Halberg, a trucker's assumed authority, in
conjuncti on with no obj et t ion to that authority from the regulatory agency,
was sufficient to form an equitable basis for estoppel when the agency sought
to restrict trucking business which had been in operation for over ten years.
The Court specifically looked to Petitioner's reliance on the agency's
silence" and the harm that wou Id be done by restrict ion of the trucking
operation. Halberg at 384.