HS 88 026 PE

                                                       4 1800 1865 2

 

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA

                        OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

 

                 FOR THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

 

 

The Department of Human

Services of  the  State

of Minnesota,                                               FINDINGS Of  FACT,

                                                            CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

                      Complainant,

 

Vs

 

Muriel Humphrey

Residences,

 

                      Respondent.

 

 

    !he above entitled matter came on for  hearing  before  Administrative  law

Judge Peter C. Erickson at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, November 25, 1981, at the

Office of Administrative Hearings, Minneapolis,  Minnesota.  the  record  on  this

matter closed on January 12, 1988, the date of receipt of the last post hearing

memorandum.

 

    Wayne G. Faris and John M. Stoxen, from the firm of Oppenheimer, Wolff &

Donnelly, Attorneys at law, 1700 First Bank Building, St. Paul, Minnesota

55101, appeared on behalf of the Minnesota Department of Human Services.

Ronald L. Haskvitz and Joel W. Lavintman, from the firm of Smith, Juster,

Feikema, Malmon & Haskvitz, Attorneys at law, 1000 IDS  Center,  80  South  Eighth

Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402, appeared on  behalf  of  the  Respondent,

Muriel Humphrey Residendes (MHR).

 

    Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to Minn.  Stat.    14.61  the  final

decision of the Commissioner of Human Services shall not  be  made  until  this

Report has been made available to the parties to the proceeding for at least

ten days, and an opportunity has been afforded to each party adversely

a f fected to file except ions and present argument to the Commi ssi oner.

Exceptions to this Report, if any, s ha I 1 be fi led with Commissi oner Sandra

Gardebring, Second Floor, Space Center Building, 444  lafayette  Road,  St.  Paul,

Minnesota 55101.

 

                               STATEMENT OF ISSUE

 

    !he issue to be determined in this proceeding is  whether  the  Department  of

Human Service% should be estopped from recovering  reimbursement  paid  Lo  MHR

for reserved bed  days.

 

    Based upon a II of I he pr oreedings here in, the Administ rative law Judge

makes the following:

 


                               FINDINGS OF FACT

 

   1.    Prior to the commencement of this hearing, the parties entered into a

Stipulation of Facts and Exhibits which constitute the basis for this

litigation,  The stipulated facts are set forth below in paragraphs a. through

o.  Exhibits referenced in the Stipulation are contained in the record but

will not  be duplicated as part of these Findings.

 

             a. The Muriel Humphrey Residences  (MHR)  are  operated

         by louise Whitbeck Fraser Community Services, Inc., a

         Minnesota nonprofit corporation.  The  MHR  have  been

         licensed continuously since November 1976, by  the  Minnesota

         Department of Human Services (DHS) and its  predecessor,  the

         Department of Public Welfare, to provide residential care

         for mentally retarded men and women over the age  of  sixteen

         years .

 

             b.  The MHR consist of three detached buildings

         located in Eden Prairie, Minnesota.  The names and addresses

         of the three bui Idings are as follows :  Charlson House,

         8151 Preserve Boulevard; Fraser House, 8761 Preserve

         Boulevard; Westby House, 8171 Preserve Boulevard.

 

             C. The MHR are facilities of a  type  commonly  referred

         to an Intermediate Care  Facility/Mental  Retardation

         (ICF/MR).  The MHR were originally licensed in 1916  to

         receive medical assistance (MA) reimbursement  for  (are

         provided to MA recipients during the following twelve

         months. (Exhibit 1.) !he licensing has  been  extended

         continuously.  Copies of the DHS records that detail how

         the three MHR buildings have been licensed are attached  as

         follows:  Charlson House, Exhibit 2 (2 pages); Eraser

         House, Exhibit 3 (2 pages); Wentby House, Exhibit  4

         (2 pages).

 

             d.  Prior to February 1980, the three MHR buildings

         were licenned an one, 36 bed ICF/MR.  Beginning  February  1,

         1980, and extending throughout the period in question in

         this case (July 1983 through February 1986), the MHR were

         licensed as three, 12 bed ICF/MR's.  Copies of the  DHS

         licenses issued February 1, 1980, to each of MHR  buildings

         are attached as follows: Charlson House, Exhibit  5;  Fraser

         Houne, Exhibit 6; Wentby House, Exhibit 7.  Copies of the

         ICF/MR provider agreements and Department of  Health

         Certification notices in force during the period  in

         question are attached an follows:  Charlson House,

         Exhibit 8 (6 pages); Eraser House, Exhibit 9 (6 pages);

         Westby House, Exhibit 10 (6 pages).

 

             e. Before the change in licensing of the  MHR  wan

         requested in 1980, representatives of the MHR met with

         Virginia Presley of DHS who recommended the MHR  separately

         license its three facilities.

 

             f. This contented case was initiated by  issuance  of  a

         Notice of Agency Action by DHS, dated May 1, 1986.  A  copy

 

 

                                     - 2 -

 


of the notice and a schedu I e attac bed to the notic e t hd  t

detai ls the claim is at tac bed as Exhi bit II (  3  pages  )  .

 

      g.  The  amount  alleged  to  be  in   dispute   in   the   Notice

of Agency Action was $32,837.17.          This amount wan Calculated

by  OHS  investigator  Thomas  L.   Neumann   after   he   conducted   an

audit  of  payments  received  by  the  MHR   between   July   1983   and

February 1986, the period in question.            Mr.   Neumann's    audit

showed that the MHR had billed and received payment for

616  days  for  which  OHS  alleges  the  MHR  was   not   entitled   to

receive payment.

 

      h.   The  MHR  do  not  contest  the  validity   of   the   audit,

except  to  the  extent  that   the   audit   purports   to   recapture

$219.84 for private-pay patient Charles Stevens.               The   OHS

accepts  the  MHR  contention  and   has   agreed   to   decrease   the

amount  sought  to  be  recovered   by   $219.84.   Thus,   it   is

agreed  by  both  parties  that  the   amount   in   controversy   is

$32,617.33

 

      i.  An  the  Notice  of   Agency   Action   (Fxhibit   11)

details,  the calculation of the amount sought to be

recovered  by  OHS  is  based  on  the  fact   that   federal   law

permits   medical   ansistance   payments   for   reserved   bed   days

only  if  "[T]he  State  plan  provides   for   such   payments   and

specifies  any   limitations   on   the   policy."   42   C.F.R.

  447.40.

      j .  The  Minnesota  State  Plan  for  reimbursing  services

provided  to  MA  recipients  allows   an   ICF/MR   to   be   reimbursed

f or residentia I    are  even  when  the  resident  in  absent  from

the facility if the resident is absent for a           home vi si I ,

camping,  or   a   hospitdl   stay.   The   State   Plan,   however,

limits   reimbursement   by   requiring   that   ICF/MR's   meet

minimum facility occupancy rates in order to  he e I i g ib I e

for reimbursement.       This reserved bed day pol      icy  is  set   for

[sicl  in  a  OHS  long  Term  Care  Bulletin  dated   April   1978,   a

copy  of  which  is   attached   an  Exhibit I  S.  The   reserved   bed

day  policy   is   also   reprinted  in  a  Long   Term   Care   Bulletin

dated  September   1983,   a   copy  of which  is  attached   as

Exhibit 13.

      k  .  OHS  mails   copies   of  all  Long  Term   Care    Bulletins

to  all  ICF/Mk providers by fi    rst-class mail at the time

such  long  Term  Care   Bulletins   are   issued.   The   MHR   received

copien of exhibils I? and 13.

 

      1.   in  the  long  Term  Care   Bulletins   altached   as

Fxhibits   12 and 13, the    OHS sets   forth   the    following

reserved   bed  days   policy:

 

           Occupancy Rate    -  the   occupancy   rate   for   purpones

           of  this  policy  may   be   calculated   separately   for

           each certified    level  of  care  in  the   facility   as

           follows:

 

 

                                   3 -


                        (1)  Determine the number of  day,  each  certi

                             fied bed was occupied  during  the  month.

                             A reserved bed may be considered as an

                             occupied bed for this purpose.

 

                        (2)  Total to determine  the  number  of  occupied

                             bed days for the month.

 

                        (3)  Divide by the number of days in the

                             current month.

 

                        (4)  Divide by the number  of  certified  beds  to

                             determine the occupancy  rate  for  the

                             month.

 

                    If the monthly average  for the full month occupancy

                    was 93% or higher (not  rounded),  the  facility  may

                    claim reserved bed days for that month if the other

                    criteria is met.

 

                    NOTE: facilities with 24 or  less  certified  beds

                    may claim reserved bed days provided that they have

                    not had d certified bed vacant  for  the  entire

                    month.  A reserved bed may  be  considered  as  an

                    occupied bed for this purpose.

 

                    All days for which payment has been  made  for  a

                    reserved bed shall he counted as actual patient

                    days for DPW Rule 49 and DPW Rule 52, rate

                    determinations.

 

          Exhibit 12 at Page 3; see also Exhibit 13 at Page 7.

 

               M. During the  period  in  question,  residents  were

          absent from the MHR buildings on the  daten  and  for  the

          number of days set forth in Exhibit  14,  pages  I  through  1.

 

                n. The MHR billed the  MA  program  and  received  payment

          of $32,617.33 for days on  which  residents  were  absent  from

          the three MHR buildings.  At  no  time  during  the  period

          relevant to this action Was the  monthly  average  for  the

          full month occupancy below 93  percent.  At  no  time  during

          the period relevant to this  action  were  there  residents

          absent from the MHR houses for one  month  at  the  name  time.

 

               0. The only issues  with  respect  lo  reserved  hod  days

          are whether the State of  Minnesota  should  he  equitably

          estopped from applying the  reserved  bed  day  limitations  net

          forth in Exhibits 12 and 13, and  how  State  rules  should  he

          applied and interpreted.

 

     2.   The primary reason given by Ms, Presley (DHS employee) to MHR for

changing  licensure status from one license to three licenses wan that in the

event of  a fire or other similar catastrophe in one of the buildings, or the

outbreak  of a communicdb I e disease, the entire fac i Iity wou Id have Io be shut

 

 

                                         4

 


down if all operated under  a  single  license.  Under  Separate  licensure,  the

unaffected facilities would be  able  to  continue  in  operation.  In  addition,

MHR also found that it would be able  to  operate  under  less  stringent  standards

in  several  areas due to the  sepa rate lic ensure of three, I? bed f ac i I it i es, as

opposed to one, 36 bed facility.  These  standards  were  in  the  areas  of  nursing

staff requirements (see, 42 C.F.R.    442.478  (1985));  dietary  service  require

ments (see 42 C.F.R.   442.413  (1985));  and  emergency  lighting  requirements

(see, 42 C.F.R.  442.453 (1985)). !here  is  nothing  in  the  record  to  indicate

that MHR received any cost benefits or greater reimbursement from the

Department of Human Services due to these less stringent standards.

 

    3.    In considering whether to make the licensure change, MHR was

concerned about whether its  funding  would  be  affected.  Consequently,  MHR,

through its Director of Residential Services,  Steven  Naill,  and  its  Executive

Director, Dr. Robert Kowalczyk, contacted Thomas  Neumann,  an  auditor  at  the

Department of Human Services, whom they had consulted  in  the  past  for  answers

to questions related to funding  and  funding  requirements.  After  the  proposed

change in licensure was explained to Mr. Neumann, he  advised  MHR  that  it  would

have no effect on its level of funding.  Neumann  further  stated  that  MHR  could

continue lo file only one cost report rather than  a  separate  cost  report  for

each licensed facility.  At the time this  advice  was  given,  Mr.  Neumann  was

not aware of the 24-bed or less exception to  the  93  percent  occupancy  rule.

He did not become aware of this provision until 1984.

 

    4.    After speaking with Mr. Neumann, MHR made the  decision  to  change  its

licensure status from one, 36 bed facility  to  three,  12  bed  facilities.  From

February, 1980 through the present, each of  the  facilities  which  comprise  the

Muriel Humphrey Residences has been licensed  as  a  separate,  12-bed  ICF/MR.

MHR has continued to submit one cost report, rather  than  three,  for  the  three

licensed facilities and has been operated in  all  meaningful  respects  as  one

facility providing intermediate care.

    5.    Consistent with Mr. Neumann's advice, the  per  diem  rate  reimbursement

remained  the same for MHR after the licensure change.  MHR thought that

Neumann's statements also applied to the application  of  the  reserved  bed  day

rule, however.

    6 .   MHR wan aware of the less than 25 bed exception  to  the  93  percent

occupancy rule at the time the decision was made to change its licensure

status.

    7.    After the licensure change, MHR continued its  policy  of  leaving  one

bed open per facility for respite care as a service to the county.       These

respite beds were nol always occupied,  however.  In  1986,  Steven  Naill  called

Thomas Neumann to inquire whether or not respite  care  beds  were  taken  into

consideration when determining compliance with the 93 percent occupancy

requirement.  At that time, Mr.  Neumann  had  changed  job  responsibilities  and

become part of the Surveillance and Utilidtion Review Section of the

Department of Human Services.  Neumann told Mr.  Naill  that  he  would  visit  MHR

in order to make d determination concerning the respite care beds.

 

    B.    During his visit to MHR, Mr. Neumann conducted  a  complete  audit  of

the census records and books.  As a result of this audit, Mr. Neumann

concluded that for the period from July of 1983  through  February  of  1986,  MHR

billed and received payment for 616 reserved bed days  it  was  not  entitled  to

receive.

 

 

                                        5 -


    9.    On May 1, 1986, the Department of Human Services sent a Notice of

Agency Action to the Muriel Humphrey Residences alleging  that  MHR  had  billed

and received payment for 616 days f or which it was not en t itled to receive

payment. this over payment was calculated  to  be  $32,837.17.  this  amount  was

subsequently reduced by $219.84, resulting an alleged over reimbursement of

$32,611.33,

 

    10. If it in determined that MHR must  reimburse  the  Department  of  Human

Services the amount alleged to be owing, that reimburnement  would  have  to  be

taken out of the current and future operating funds of MHR.  this payback

would affect the quality of care MHR would be able to provide.

 

    11.  Because of this action taken by the Department, MHR does not currently

offer respite bed accommodations.

 

    12. During the relevant time period herein, MHR  operated  at  a  93  percent

or greater occupancy when that calculation in baned on a total capacity of

36 beds.  There was never a time when all three  respite  beds  were  vacant  for

an entire month at the name time.

 

    Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Administrative low Judge

makes the following:

 

                                   CONCLUSIONS

 

    1.    The Admininsrative law Judge and the Commissioner  of  Human  Services

have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Minn, Stat. sec.  14.50 did

256B.064, subd. 2 (1986).

 

    2 .   I he Notice of Hearing was p roper as to form and ton I en t.  th e

Department has complied w ith a I 1 other subs tan t ive and proc edura I requ i rements

of law or rule.

 

    3.    For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum below,  the  Department  of

Human Services is estopped from claiming reimbursement as alleged herein.

 

    Based upon the foregoing Conclusions, the  Administrative  law  judge  makes

the following:

 

                                 RECOMMENDATION

 

    If IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner of  Human  Services  issue  an

Order dismissing thin matter with prejudice.

 

Dated  this     day of February, 1988.

 

 

 

                                          PETER  C. ERICKSON

                                          Administrative law Judge

 

                                     NOTICE

 

    Pursuant to Minn.  Stat.  14.62, subd. 1, the agency  in  required  to  serve

its f ind I dec i s !on upon each party and the Administ rat ive law Judge by f i rst

c 1 ass ma i 1 .

 

Reported:  taped, No Transcript Prepared.

 


                                    MEMORANDUM

 

    MHR, for the first time in its responsive brief, challenges the subject

matter jurisdiction of the Department, alleging that neither Minn, Stat.

 256B.064, subd, la. or Minn.  Rules 9500.1080, subp. 3, 9505.1910 or

9505.1920 apply herein.  The Department has objected to Respondent raising

these issues for the first time in its responsive brief.  the Judge is not

going to engage in a lengthy discussion of the jurisdictional issue for

several reasons.  First, the Respondent  stipulated  that  the  only  issue  to  be

tried in this proceeding was the "estoppel" issue.  The  Judge  is  aware  that  it

is horn book law that a party never waives a subject matter jurisdiction

defense.  However, that issue has not been fully litigated in this case

because the Department was not put on notice that it  would  be  an  issue  raised

by the Respondent.

 

    Second, this Judge has already determined in a case with very similar

facts that jurisdiction exists pursuant to Minn.  Stat.    256B,064,  4ubd4.  la.

and 2 (1986).  See, Minnesota Department  of  Human  Services  v.  Fulton  Residence

and--Innovative Homes, Inc.  HS 86 -004 PE (Report issued July  20,  1987)   The

Commissioner of Human Services issued  a  final  decision  affirming  this

determination on October 2,  1981.  Specifically,  the  Judge  reads  the   language

contained in Minn.  Stat.  256B.064, subd.  la.  broadly  enough  to  encompass   the

factual situation presented herein.

 

    !he central issue tried in this case is  whether  the  Department  is  estopped

from claiming reimbursement for reserved bed days as alleged herein.  MHR

contends that the representations made by  Thomas  Neumann  and  its  reliance  on

those representations, in conjunction with the detriment it would suffer if

the Department were to recover, constitutes a suf ficient  basis  for  equitable

estoppel. !he Department argues that it was  not  "reasonable"  for  MHR  to  rely

on anything Mr. Neumann said to them because Neumann's job responsibilities

did not include the interpretation or enforcement  of  reserved  bed  day  require

ments.  Consequently, he was not in a position  to  bind  the  Department  on  that

issue when he merely stated that MHR's funding would not be changed as a

result of the relicensure.

 

    In order to establish estoppel against  the  government,  a  party  must  show

that representations or inducements were made, upon which that party reasonably

relied, and that the party will be harmed if the claim Of estoppel is not

allowed.  Northern Petrochemical Company v. United States Fire Insurance

Company, 277 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1979).  The  government  may  be  estopped  if

justice requires, but that principle will  not  be  "freely  applied

Mesaba Aviation v, County of Itasca, 258 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1977).   lo

estop  a government agency, some element of fault or wrongful  conduc  t  must  be

shown.  Ridgewood Development Company v. State,  294  N.W.2d  288,  292  93  (Minn.

1980).  A party seeking to estop a  governmental  agency  carries  a  heavy  burden

of proof.  Brown v. Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, 368 N.W.2d 906,

910 (Minn. 1985).  However, a court will always weigh the public interest

frustrated by the estoppel against the equities  in  the  cane.  Id.,  Residential-

Alternatives v. Department of Human Services, 387  N.W.2d  885,  891  (Minn.  App.

 

 

   Depending on the facts   of a specific case, the  Minnesota  Court  of  Appeals

has used a balancing test to determine whether the principle of equitable

 

 

                                        7

 


estoppel should apply.  Beaty v. Minnesota Board  of  Teaching,  354  N.W.2d  466,

471 (Minn.  App, 1984); Petition of Halberg Construction  and  Supply,  Inc.,  385

N.W.2d 381, 384 (Minn.  App. 1986).l In those  cases,  the  Court  of  Appeals

did not find specific "wrongful conduct" on behalf of  the  State  agencies

involved.  Rather, the Court employed a  balancing  test,  weighing  the  public

interest against the equities shown by the petitioner.  the Judge has

concluded that the "balancing" approach should be used herein to achieve a

just result.    See also, Brown at 913.

 

    The facts  in this case show clearly that if MHR had continued its

operation as a single, 36 bed facility, it would be entitled to the

reimbursement  it received for the reserved bed days at  issue.  It  is  only

MHR's decision to change its licensure status which resulted in the

disallowance of the reserved bed  days  reimbursement.  MHR's  community  based

decision to maintain an "open" respite bed in each of  the  12  bed  facilities

caused it to not meet the requirements of the less than  25  bed  exception  to

the occupancy rule, At all relevant times herein,  MHR  fully  met  the  reserved

bed occupancy limit for facilities having over 25  beds.  There  is  no  evidence

in the record to suggest that MHR's change in licensure  status  resulted  in  any

greater cost savings and/or reimbursement.

 

    Although Mr. Neumann was not the "right" person to seek advice from

concerning all of the implications of relicensure, MHR relied upon his

statement that funding would not  be  affected  due  to  the  licennure  change.  Mr.

Neumann was a DHS  auditor  whose  responsibilities  included  calculating  and

authorizing per diem rates.  If MHR is forced to repay the $32,000 at issue,

those monies will have to come out of future operating funds and result in a

lesser quality of care for residents.  A final important factor is that  DHS

took no act ion to remedy the mi stake from 1 980 Io 1 986 even though it knew

that MHR's licensure had been (hanged.  The Judge is convinced that the

equities in favor of MHR far outweigh the public interest that May he

frustrated by estopping the Department of Human  Services  in  this  situation.

Consequently, the Judge has recommended that this matter be dismissed.

 

                                     p.c.E .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

     In Beaty, an applicant for a license as a school psychologist relied on

advice from the executive secretary of the Board of  leaching  to  complete

course work leading to licensure.  After  completion  of  the  educational  require

ment, Appellant's application was denied because of deficiencies in the program

of courses.  The Court applied a balancing  test,  holding  that,  "Applying

estoppel against the government in this case will  not  frustrate  any  legitimate

public purpose, while failing to apply it will result in great hardship to

appellant."  Beaty at 411.    In Halberg, a trucker's  assumed  authority,  in

conjuncti on with no obj et t ion to that authority from the regulatory  agency,

was sufficient to form an equitable basis for estoppel when the agency sought

to restrict trucking business which had been in operation for over ten years.

The Court specifically looked to Petitioner's reliance on the agency's

silence" and the harm that wou Id be done by restrict ion of the trucking

operation.  Halberg at 384.