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DOCKET NO. 12-1700-15387-2 |
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DHR Case No. 40421 |
STATE OF MINNESOTA
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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Christine
Hernandez, Charging
Party, v. Minnesota
Correctional Facility – Oak
Park Heights, Respondent. |
DISCOVERY
ORDER |
This matter
is before the Administrative Law Judge based upon objections raised by Charging
Party at the Prehearing Conference, held August 13, 2003, regarding
Respondent’s Interrogatories and Document Requests. The parties submitted letter briefs on the matter on August 15,
2003.
Christopher
R. Walsh, Attorney at Law, 270 Grain Exchange North Building, 301 Fourth Avenue
South, Minneapolis, MN 55415, represents Charging Party Christine
Hernandez. Yvonne Shorts, Assistant
Attorney General, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100, St. Paul, MN 55101-2128,
represents the Department of Corrections.
Based upon the record in this matter,
the Administrative Law Judge makes the following:
1.
Charging Party shall
provide Respondent with signed authorizations to release her medical and
pharmacy records from January 1, 2000, to the present.
2.
Charging Party shall
provide information regarding past employment as requested by Respondent. However, Charging Party shall not be
required to provide the amounts of unemployment compensation, workers’
compensation insurance proceeds, or any other wage replacement benefits she may
have received.
3.
Any private or
confidential data provided in this matter shall be subject to the Protective
Order issued in this matter on August 27, 2003.
Dated this 27th
day of August, 2004.
_/s/
Steve M. Mihalchick______
STEVE
M. MIHALCHICK
Administrative
Law Judge
Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
(“MHRA”), Charging Party seeks damages for mental anguish,[1]
among other things, in a claim arising from Charging Party’s allegations of
sexual harassment on the job.
Respondent asserts that by raising the issue of mental anguish, Charging
Party has placed her mental condition in controversy, thereby waiving medical
privilege.
An award of mental anguish damages does not require severe
suffering or physical injury, and damages may be awarded based upon the
subjective testimony of a charging party or her relatives and friends.[2]
Minnesota case law states that “[a] sexual harassment
plaintiff does not automatically place her mental condition in
issue. However, where a sexual
harassment plaintiff claims psychological damage such as chronic anxiety,
impaired relationships, a sense of low-esteem, and a feeling of blame, that
sexual harassment plaintiff has placed her medical condition in controversy and
discovery by the defendants into that condition may be allowed.[3] Of course, discovery may be limited and
private medical data must be maintained as not public by the party receiving
it.[4] In this case, the Charging Party seeks
damages for mental anguish related to several physical and emotional conditions
she alleges resulted from the sexual harassment, some of which require her to
take medication. Thus, she has placed
her mental condition in controversy and waived her medical privilege with
respect to that condition. Respondent
is therefore entitled to reasonable discovery to explore those claims.
In Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3rd 1287,
1292-93 (8th Cir. 1997), the Defendants had sought to discover
personal events in the lives of the Plaintiffs including detailed medical
histories, childhood experiences, domestic abuse, abortions, and sexual
relationships. The 8th
Circuit stated that such discovery was not relevant and so remote in time that
it should not have been allowed.
The incidents complained of in this
matter occurred in December, 2001.
Respondent seeks an order compelling Charging Party to execute
authorizations for release of medical and pharmacy records. It does not seek an adverse medical
examination. Respondent seeks medical
records back to 1994 based on statements regarding medications in Charging
Party’s deposition. The request goes back
too far. Respondent will be allowed
access to medical and pharmacy records back to January 1, 2000, which is
approximately two years before the incidents occurred. However, the scope of the discovery need not
be limited to counseling related to the sexual harassment claims. That would narrow the scope too much. The fact that Charging Party does not intend
to call any expert witnesses has no impact on the scope of discovery. Respondent is still entitled to reasonable
discovery to explore Charging Party’s claims.
Charging Party objects to providing information regarding
any unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation, or disability benefits she
may have received. Charging Party cites
Young v. City of Duluth, 410 NW2d 27 (Minn. App. 1987), a Veteran’s
Preference case, for the proposition that generally unemployment compensation
is not regarded as compensation received from other employment so as to be
deductible in mitigation of damages.[5] Young did hold
that, but other cases have held just the opposite.[6] More recently, it was held that the Veterans
Preferences cases should not be followed and that Title VII precedent should
be. The Title VII cases say the
“collateral source rule” should be applied.[7] The general rule in Minnesota applicable in
tort cases is the “collateral source rule.”
It provides that any benefit conferred upon the injured person from a
collateral source is not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although
it may partially or completely reimburse the Plaintiff for the injuries.[8] Applying that rule here, if Charging Party
were ultimately awarded any damages for lost wages, there would be no offset
for any workers’ compensation, unemployment compensation, or other wage
replacement benefits she may have received.
Thus, she should not be required to provide any information regarding
the amounts of any such benefits.
SMM
[1] Minn. Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2.
[2] Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471
N.W.2d 670, 677 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied; see also Kohn v. City of Minneapolis
Fire Department, 583 N.W.2d 7, 14-15 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied
(upholding mental anguish damages in a MHRA claim regarding failure to promote
a Hispanic fire fighter); Ryther v. KARE 11, 864 F.Supp. 1525 (D. Minn.
1994) (noting that expert testimony or medical evidence is not mandatory to
support an award of mental anguish under the MHRA); Kim v. Nash Finch
Company, 123 F.3d 1046, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997) (medical or other
expert evidence is not required to prove emotional distress under Title VII).
[3] Kresko v. Rulli, 432 NW2d 764, 770 (Minn. App. 1988) rev. denied (1989); Gillson v. Department of Natural Resources, 492 NW2d 835 (Minn. App. 1992) rev. denied (1993).
[4] Haynes v.
Anderson,
232 NW2d 196, 200 (Minn. 1975).
[5] Actually, Charging Party cited an earlier appeal of this case at 372 NW2d 57 (Minn. App. 1985).
[6] See, e.g. Pawelk v. Camden Township, 415 NW2d 47 (Minn. App. 1987).
[7] Hamlin v. Super 8 Motel, 2000 WC 622274, unpublished (Minn. App. 2000).
[8] Hueper v. Goodrich, 314 NW2d 828 (Minn. 1982).